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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal by virtue of the provisions of Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103G).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment and

granting the OHA's Motion for Summary Judgment as to the OHA's authority to act as
the governing body pursuant to the Declaration when the OHA has acted as the governing
body pursuant to the Declaration for over twenty seven (27) years, the homeowners have
repeatedly ratified its authority and no competing association has emerged? Standard of
Review: Correctness. Cedar Mtn. Envtl Inc., v. Tooele County, 214 P.3d 95 (Utah 2009)
2.

Did the trial court err in holding that because Riley Bratt, who is not an engineer,

did not see the Property prior to the construction and has never bid a segmented block
retaining wall, he was not qualified to provide reliable expert testimony as to alternative
materials to be used in the construction of the retaining walls? Standard of Review:
Abuse of Discretion. Utah v. Brink, 173 P.3d 183, 184 (2007).
3.

Did the trial court err in granting the OHA's motion for directed verdict as to

Appellant's defense that the OHA had failed to mitigate its damages when Appellant
failed to provide any evidence that a less expensive alternative was reasonable? Standard
of Review: Correctness. Goebel v. Salt Lake City, 104 P.3d 1185, 1190 (Utah 2004).
4.

Did the trial court err in granting the OHA's motion for directed verdict as to

Appellant's defense that the OHA had materially breached the Declaration, when the
plans were approved pursuant to the Declaration, reasonable notice was provided to
1

Appellant, Uu. lioinjowrurrs ri-.iiik-r- ilu sjuvia] asscs-;n';C::. impos-..:1 by t!v; OHA. nr*C ,
resolution was not required by the Declaration? Standard of Review: Correctness.
Goebel v. Salt Lake City, 104 P.3d 1185, 1190 (Utah 2004).
5.

Did the trial court err in granting the OHA's motion for dircciea vcruici L> L-

App^i^i" : defers: i^; ih. O'' • ]- '*''• ]^::-Av^\ i- - i .:;)!!. .! *• >•: -.-r or<_-u ,-] f-i;l- i^i
fair dealing when the Appellant repeatedly failed to respond to notices mailed to him,
failed to keep the Property in a safe condition and the OHA was acting pursuant to the
Declaration..? Standard of Review: Correctness, (iochj' •

. \ L,a-r c \ . .

]

**

1185, 1190 (Utah 2004).
6.

Did the trial court err in granting the OHA's motion for directed verdict as the

Appellant's defense that the OHA waived its right to act pursuant to the Declaration
when the OH A.. has continually acted according to the Declaration for over twenty seven
(27) years, the homeowners, including Appellant, have ratified its authority to act as
such, and no competing association has emerged? Standard of Review: Correctness.
Goebel v. Salt Lake City, 104 P 3< 1 1185, 11.90 ( f Itah 2004).
7.

Did the trial court err in awarding the OHA all pre-judgment interest requested

when the Declaration states that the exterior maintenance fees shall be added to the
l ; l i . i : ' ; J (.liie> v l i k " Oi v U\'>{j * '•' Jl-.iiu'.lj \

[ U\-. '• '*:'"\

i :'

i. :.

•; ^ . ! ; i 7 !' i: I i d : ! i \ i v )\

)\^V\C'"r:

Correctness. Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d 1064, 1068 (Utah 2003).
8.

Did the trial court err in awarding the OHA litigation expenses in the amount of

$403.82? Standard oj Review: Abuse of Discretion. Jensen v. Sawyers, \Mi !\ '•;! J,.::>,
351 (Utah 2005).
9

9.

Did the trial court err in awarding the OHA all attorneys' fees requested when the

Appellant failed to provide any evidence as to what the correct amount should be and the
fees were reasonable in light of the services provided? Standard of Review: Abuse of
Discretion. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988).
10.

Is the prevailing party on appeal entitled to attorney fees incurred on appeal?
STATEMENT OF CASE
George Landrith ("Appellant") was the title owner of a residential lot (the

"Property") the George Osmond Estates Subdivision located at 892 Osmond Lane, Provo,
Utah. In April of 1977 the Declaration of Protective Covenants ("Declaration") was
recorded in the Utah County Recorders Office and is admittedly recorded against the
Property and the George Osmond Estates Subdivision ("Subdivision"). From 1979Present the Osmond Lane Homeowners Association (the "OHA"), has acted as the
governing association pursuant to the Declaration. The OHA has assessed annual and
special assessments, cared for the common areas, had annual meetings, elected a board to
govern the OHA, been continuously ratified by the homeowners within the Subdivision,
and no competing association has emerged. R. 321, 105-107, 301, 93, 101-102, 147-318,
320-322.
In 2006, the OHA filed a complaint to enforce a lien assessed against the Property
for costs it had incurred in causing certain work to be performed on the Property pursuant
to the Declaration, to cure exterior safety and maintenance issues that arose due to soil
erosion and lack of repair and maintenance. R. 1-33. Appellant refused to pay for the
repair work provided to the Property. R. 1547 pg. 89-93, 1548 pg. 235. The OHA filed a

3

Notice of Lien on January 13, 200:'. fbi tV u^p:-.id a'nou.p:^. in»o:-est cosis. iate fees,
attorney fees, and expenses. R. 23-24.
Appellant moved for summary judgment asserting that the OHA lacked the
authority to assess fees or assert liens under the Declaration arid alten latively the OHA
moved for summaiy judgment asserting that the OLIA had authority to act pursuant to the
Declaration. R. 53-69, 401-475. Appellant does not dispute that the Property is subject
to the Declaration and the Property is generally subject to assessments for exterior
maintenance. The trial coin*!:: determined ti :iat the 01 1 A. had authority to act pursuai it the
terms of the Declaration, which ruling is included in the appeal. R. 706-708.
The Property was in general disrepair in the fall of 2005, including erosion that
had caused aliole to forn i o:i i the Property undermining the integrity of multiple retaining
walls on the Property and adjacent property. R. 435-436, 1547 pg. 71, 73-74, 1548 pg.
173, 259. After approximately seven (7) years of demanding Appellant remedy the
erosion problem, the OPIA's concerns with the safety issues surrounding the Property
forced it to take reasoirink* stv;>> to p>vv-/i;; funnc;- d;,:u:=;-.i. !'• i^:

n

'o;\*]v iw ;

surrounding properties by having two retaining walls installed on the Property. R. 1160,
1547 pg. 143-144, 639-641, 394-400. Notices were appropriately delivered to Appellant
lvn •!: I'epuir o f f " . ' P r o p - Y i ; , s- ItMi<v- <»f.:•.>.,tiv.ckir-. an* 1 \c:\r\,>^'\<

:;

!:

^ ':

response being provided by Appellant. R. 1165, 1179, 1547 pg. 89-92, 134, 10 i, 115116, 1548 pg. 200.
At trial Appellant attempted to introduce expert testimony that an alternative less
costly retaining wall system could have been install. 1 - - •>. - i v :, •:-!-,-;
4

v..v

{]-

;-: ji

i

Bratt, who was not an engineer, had never viewed the Property prior to repairs being
completed, and who had never bid a block retaining wall in the past. The trial court
granted the OHA's objection as to Mr. Bratt's reliability to provide expert testimony.
This ruling is also included in the appeal.
Furthermore, at trial the court granted the OHA's motion for directed verdict
regarding the Appellant's defenses that the OHA had failed to mitigate its damages,
materially breached the Declaration, waived its right to act pursuant to the Declaration,
and breached its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Thereafter the jury returned a verdict awarding the OHA $33,143.62. The OHA
requested and was granted an award of attorney fees, costs and pre-judgment interest.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

In 1977, a Declaration of Protective Covenants (the "Declaration") was recorded

against all lots in the George Osmond Estates Subdivision, Utah County, Utah (the
"Subdivision"). R. 1210-1232. A copy of the Declaration is attached hereto as
Addendum A.
2.

The Appellant, George C. Landrith ("Appellant") was the title owner of real

property located within the George Osmond Estates Subdivision located at 892 Osmond
Lane, Provo, Utah (the "Property"), which is more particularly described as:
Lot 144, Plat "B", George Osmond Estates Subdivision, Provo, Utah,
according to the official plat thereof, recorded in the Office of the County
Recorder of Utah County, Utah. R. 1156-1158.
3.

The Osmond Lane Homeowners Association is an unincorporated association that

has acted as the governing body regarding the Declaration since approximately 1979. R.
5

321.
4.

No other organization or association has ever attempted or emerged to enforce the

Declaration. R. 321.
5.

The Osmond Lane Homeowners Association ("OHA") has collected dues and

assessments, conducted annual meetings, maintained the common area, and performed all
functions pursuant to the Declaration. R. 321.
6.

OHA has conducted meetings concerning the requirements of the Declaration and

has also elected members of the Subdivision to the Board of Directors and position of
president. R. 105-107,301.
7.

On May 28, 2002, the OHA filed a complaint to foreclose the Notice of Lien,

Entry No. 2682:2002 upon the Property for $604.00 for unpaid annual and special
assessment, together with late fees, interest, costs, and attorneys' fees. R. 138-145, 349.
8.

Appellant, in response to the OHA's prior complaint #020402193, filed a

"Request for Hearing" on September 5, 2002. R. 112-113.
9.

Appellant states within the "Request for Hearing" at Paragraph 6, Page 2, "Other:

The Member of the Homeowners Association did not have the Association's
authorization to Accumulate the Legal Fees." Appellant's signature appears underneath
the above statement. R. 112. Appellant did not contend that the OHA did not have
authority under the Declaration but merely argued that a member of the association did
not have the OHA's authorization to incur legal fees. R. 112.
10.

On September 20, 2002, a Writ of Execution Hearing was held by District Court

Judge Burningham in connection with complaint #020402193 and Appellant's Request

for Hearing. R. 110. At the Writ of Execution Hearing Judge Burningham determined
that the writ was issued properly by the OHA and the Property was not exempt from
execution for Appellant's failure to pay the annual and special assessments due. R. 110.
11.

The OHA was recognized as the appropriate entity to collect annual dues by the

Fourth Judicial District Court on September 20, 2002. R. 110.
12.

OHA has generated financial reports reflecting expenses, collection of fees from

homeowner, and maintenance of common areas. R. 103-104.
13.

OHA has removed snow during the winter months from the private roads with the

boundaries of the Subdivision; removed leaves, trimmed and maintained trees and lawns;
maintained and repaired the street black top including but not limited to pothole repairs,
repaving and sealing of the street asphalt, and the installation of brick pavers at the
entrance to Osmond Lane; repaired and maintained the neighborhood entry gate;
maintained, repaired and replaced street lights and lamp posts; maintained and repaired
storm drains and sewer systems. All repairs, maintenance and improvements have been
for the benefit of the property owners within the Subdivision. R. 93, 101-102, 147-318,
320-322.
14.

Appellant attended at least one (1) annual meeting held by OHA while he was a

member of OHA. R. 301, 147-318.
15.

In 2006, OHA filed a complaint to enforce a lien assessed against the Appellant

Property. R. 1-33.
16.

From the time that Appellant bought the Property and until he sold the Property he

was assessed and paid annual and special assessments while he was a member of the
7

OHA. R. 95-96, 321, 1547, pg. 36.
17.

Pursuant to the recorded Declaration every parcel located in the Subdivision shall

be "maintained by the owner thereof in a clean, safe, attractive and sightly condition, and
in good repair . . . ." Section 7.11. R. 1225.
18.

Appellant repeatedly failed to adequately maintain the Property in a manner that

was in accordance with the Declaration, including the maintenance of an exterior brick
wall, collapsed rain gutter, missing exterior door, untrimmed landscaping, undermined
concrete stairs and retaining walls and an erosion hole on the Property. R. 1547 pg. 4347, 82-83, 1548 pg. 246-247.
19.

From approximately 1992-1994, after Appellant acquired the Property, a sprinkler

pipe on the Property froze and broke causing water to flood the backyard and flow into
the eroded area causing a hole to be created on the Property. R. 1547, pg. 53.
20.

From 1994-2004, multiple sprinkler breaks and leaks on the Property caused water

to repeatedly flow into the eroded area causing additional erosion and increasing the size
of the hole. R. 1548 pg. 235.
21.

The backyard of the Property was at the top of a fairly steep gully and many of the

homes in the Subdivision had retaining walls installed on the back of their property.
22.

In 2003, OHA sent a letter to Appellant informing him of their concern about the

"hole" on the Property and reminding Appellant that they have requested that the hole be
repaired by Appellant for the previous five (5) years. R. 1160, 1547 pg. 143-144.
23.

In 2003, the OHA Board of Managers inspected the erosion that was occurring on

the Appellant Property. R. 1547, pg. 70-71.

24.

In 2003, Appellant vacated the Property, leaving no one to look over it and moved

to Bountiful, Utah. R. 1547 pg. 40, 74.
25.

Appellant testified that some deterioration had occurred on the Property prior to

him purchasing the Property, but that he did not take any steps to fix or remedy the soil
deterioration while he owned the Property. R. 1547, pg. 49, 51, 54.
26.

Beginning in 2003, Nevin Anderson, a Board Member of OHA had multiple

discussions with Appellant regarding the erosion and the hole, and the problems had to be
remedied. R. 1168, 1547 pg. 77, 89, 132, 134.
27.

On April 15, 2004, Nevin Anderson, OHA Board President, looked at Appellant's

sprinkler system and was instructed by Appellant to fix the sprinkler system and to send
the bills to Appellant to be paid. R. 1174, 1548 pg. 227.
28.

On June 30, 2004, Nevin Anderson called Appellant to inform him that the hole on

the Property needed to be fixed and the OHA would like it fixed within two (2) months.
R. 1171, 1548 pg. 231-232.
29.

The Property is subject to the covenants in the Declaration and is generally subject

to assessments for exterior maintenance. R. 394-400, 65. Pursuant to the Declaration the
OHA had the authority to perform exterior maintenance on the Property:
Exterior Maintenance. In addition to maintenance upon the Common Area,
the Council may provide exterior maintenance upon each Parcel which is
subject to assessment under this Article VI hereof, as follows: paint, repair,
replace and care for roofs, gutters, downspouts, exterior building surfaces,
trees, shrubs, grass walks, and other exterior improvements.
Section 6.11. R. 1226.
30.

On July 23, 2004, Nevin Anderson met with Appellant and an independent
9

contractor to discuss possible repair solutions for the hole on the Property. R. 1548 pg.
231.
31.

On August 28, 2004, Nevin Anderson spoke to Appellant about fixing the hole on

the Property and that an engineer and permit would be needed. Nevin Anderson also
agreed to look into the cost of engineering services. R. 1169, 1548 pg. 233.
32.

On the 2nd and 3 rd of November 2004, Nevin Anderson spoke to Steve Smith, an

engineer with Earthtec, regarding the Property, erosion and the hole. R. 1168, 1548 pg.
233-234.
33.

On November 3, 2004, Nevin Anderson relayed his discussion with Steve Smith to

Appellant regarding repairing the Property. R. 1168, 1548 pg. 234.
34.

OHA had provided multiple notices and requests to Appellant to have the erosion

and hole repaired, and when Appellant failed to make the necessary repairs the OHA
provided those needed repairs pursuant to the Declaration:
Access at Reasonable Hours. For the purpose solely of performing the
maintenance required by this Article, the Council, through its duly
authorized agents or employees shall have the right, after reasonable notice
to the Owner, to enter upon any Parcel . . . .
Section 6.13. R. 1226.
35.

By 2005, the erosion had caused a safety issue due to the depth of the hole and

lack of support for concrete stairs and retaining walls located above the hole on the
Property. R. 435-436, 1547 pg. 71, 73-74, 1548 pg. 173,259.
36.

Prior to any OHA authorized construction an existing railroad tie retaining wall

was located next to and above the hole on the Property. The railroad tie retaining wall

1A

was not functioning at all and it had partially collapsed into the hole. R. 1547 pg. 72,
1548pg. 170.
37.

In 2005, the OHA was concerned with the safety issues surrounding the conditions

of the Property, the structural integrity of the neighbor's retaining wall, a different
retaining wall existing on the Property and surrounding property values. R. 436, 1263.
38.

There is another retaining wall on the east side of the Property separating the

Property with the adjacent parcel. Because of the erosion on the Property that retaining
wall had begun to settle causing a six to eight (6-8) inch crack in that wall. Without
remedying the erosion and hole, that larger retaining wall would have failed causing
extensive damage to the Property and the adjacent parcel. R. 1040, 1547 pg. 140, 1548
pg. 205, 264.
39.

Because of the erosion on the Property, a tree that was located next to the hole had

been undermined and ultimately was leaning on such an angle that a safety issue was
created requiring the OHA to have the tree removed. R. 1547 pg. 73, 1548 pg. 168.
40.

Pursuant to the Declaration in 2005-2006, the OHA incurred costs in having work

performed on the Property to cure exterior safety and maintenance issues that arose due
to soil erosion and lack of repair and maintenance. R. 639-641, 394-400.
41.

OHA began fixing the erosion problem by having the hole cleaned out and having

engineering studies performed. R. 1547 pg. 87, 1031-1033.
42.

Earthtec Testing and Engineering, P.C. (hereinafter "Earthtec"), was retained by

OHA to perform the necessary engineering studies and reports regarding the retaining
walls and to provide a building permit. R. 1168, 1176, 1254-1255, 1547 pg. 90-91, 1548
11

pg. 170,234.
43.

During all applicable times Earthtec was owned and operated by Steve Smith. R.

1041, 1548 pg. 164.
44.

The soil conditions of the Property were of sandy silt type of materials and,

because of the conditions of the Property, were subject to continued erosion. R. 1263,
1548 pg. 166-167,193-194.
45.

Earthtec recommended to the OHA that the erosion and hole be fixed by replacing

the railroad tie retaining wall with a block retaining wall system and installing a drainage
system. Earthtec also assisted CKR Engineers in the drawing of the plans. R. 10311033, 1547 pg. 108-109, 1548 pg. 168, 197.
46.

Plans for the construction of the retaining walls were provided to OHA for its

approval and review. The plans were subsequently approved by the OHA. R. 10311033, 1548 pg. 221-222.
47.

All of the members of OHA, except Appellant, paid their proportionate share of

costs associated with the construction of the retaining walls showing their approval of the
work and the plans. R. 222.
48.

A moisture drainage system was designed and constructed in the replacement

retaining walls to release pressure that may result from water building up in the soil
behind the retaining walls that may weaken the integrity of the walls. R. 1031-1033,
1037-1041, 1263, 1547 pg. 88, 1548 pg. 203, 258.
49.

The retaining walls were constructed with filter fabric to prevent fine grain

materials from flowing through and weakening the walls. Additionally, the retaining
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walls were constructed using geogrid material to increase the stability of the walls and to
reduce movement of the soil behind the walls. R. 1031-1033, 1548 pg. 174, 252-257.
50.

The OHA sent Appellant an invoice on May 28, 2005, that was properly

addressed, sealed and with the correct postage, for the engineering work that had been
performed on the Property. The invoice also informed Appellant that bids were being
requested for the construction of the retaining walls. R. 1165, 1179, 1547 pg. 89-90, 134.
51.

Appellant failed to respond or take any action with the OHA or the Property

regarding the May 28,2005 letter. R. 1547 pg. 89-92.
52.

Earthtec incurred fees in the amount of $2,948.12, for work it performed, or had

subcontractors perform, on the Property relating to the retaining walls and the OHA has
paid Earthtec that amount. R. 1176, 1257-1260, 1547 pg. 93, 102, 1548 pg. 180.
53.

CKR Engineers was retained by Earthtec to provide services to the Property. CKR

Engineers invoiced Earthtec and OHA for services it performed on the Property. CKR
Engineers invoiced OHA in the amount of $248.87 and OHA subsequently paid that
amount to CKR Engineers. R. 1197, 1547 pg. 101, 115-116, 1548 pg. 200.
54.

The OHA sent Appellant another invoice dated September 25, 2005, that was

properly addressed, sealed and with the correct postage, for the partial completion of the
retaining walls on the Property. R. 1165, 1185-1186, 1547 pg. 89,93, 135.
55.

Appellant failed to respond or take any action with the OHA or the Property

regarding the September 25, 2005 letter or the repairs made to the Property. R. 1547 pg.
89-90, 92-93.
56.

Interlock Paving was retained by OHA to construct the retaining walls designed by
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the engineers and incurred fees in the amount of $29,624.43, for construction of the
retaining walls on the Property, which was subsequently paid for by the OHA. R. 1186,
1547 pg. 94-103, 115-117.
57.

The size, design and dimensions of the retaining walls were reasonable and

necessary to provide continued stability and to stop the continuing erosion of the Property
and adjacent properties and structures. R. 1548 pg. 181.
58.

Rainmaker of Utah incurred fees in the amount of $235.20, for sprinkler repairs it

performed as part of the backyard landscaping and preventative measures regarding
future erosion on the Property. Rainmaker of Utah invoiced OHA for the fees incurred
and OHA paid that amount. Rainmaker of Utah provided additional services as a
subcontractor of Interlock Paving and was paid by Interlock for those services. R. 1185,
1547pg. 94, 115, 117, 124, 1548 pg. 260-261.
59.

The OHA sent Appellant another invoice for the final completion of the retaining

walls on December 11,2005. R. 1203, 1547 pg. 89-90.
60.

Appellant failed to respond or take any action with the OHA or the Property

regarding the final invoice and accounting provided by OHA. R. 1547 pg. 89-90, 1548
pg.235.
61.

The OHA paid a total of $33,056.62 for work performed on the Property relating

to the erosion and hole. R. 114-117.
62.

The OHA subsequently filed a Notice of Lien on January 13, 2006, for the unpaid

amounts, interest, costs, late fees, attorneys5 fees, expenses and after-accruing annual and
special assessments. R. 1207-1208.
1A

63.

OHA incurred filing fees associated with the lien that was recorded on the

Property. R. 1185, 1547 pg. 94.
64.

Appellant admits the OHA has incurred attorneys' fees in connection with the

instant action. R. 449.
65.

The construction of the two (2) retaining walls, with the engineering services, was

reasonable and necessary to provide stability to the Property as well as adjacent
properties and structures. R. 1548 pg. 181, 195, 239.
66.

The purposes of the new retaining walls were to replace the previously existing

railroad tie retaining wall and restore the Property to the condition prior to the erosion
and were not capital improvements to the Property or to common area of the OHA. R.
1228, 1548 pg. 220, 223-224.
67.

Bringing fill material onto the Property in 2005 to remedy the hole and erosion

issues rather than constructing the retaining walls would have eventually resulted in
another erosion and hole problem in the future. R. 1548 pg. 182, 208.
68.

Appellant retained Mr. Riley Bratt, (hereinafter "Bratt") for the purpose of

providing an opinion as to an alternative method that may have been used to remedy the
erosion problem. R. 528-530.
69.

Mr. Bratt is not an engineer and has no expertise or professional qualification to

make a determination as to what kind of retaining wall is necessary to adequately resolve
the erosion problem. R. 1548 pg. 291.
70.

Mr. Bratt testified that his company uses an engineer to help design the stone walls

his company builds. R. 1548 pg. 289.
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71.

Mr. Bratt did not pay to have the Property looked at by an engineer to determine if

installing a rock retaining wall would adequately resolve the erosion problem before
creating his bid. Further, Mr. Bratt could not testify what the engineer would say would
be required for the wall to be built correctly. R. 1548 pg.
72.

Mr. Bratt only saw the Property after the retaining walls had been installed by

Interlock Paving and did not see the condition of the erosion or hole. R. 1548 pg. 287288,290.
73.

Mr. Bratt's bid is based on the amount he believed he could have built the

retaining walls for using rock material rather then segmented block material, which the
OHA's engineer recommended, and not accounting for any engineering fees. R. 1548 pg.
303.
74.

Mr. Bratt testified that he had never bid a block wall project. R. 1548 pg. 302.

75.

Appellant has admitted that he has received benefits from the actions of the OH A

regarding the Property. R. 450, 452-454.
76.

Notices were appropriately delivered upon Appellant for the foreclosure of the

lien.R. 1207-1208.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The OHA has acted as the governing body pursuant to the Declaration for over
twenty seven (27) years, the homeowners have repeatedly ratified the OHA's authority
and no competing association has emerged. Even though the OHA is not specified as the
homeowners association in the Declaration it has acted as such for many years. In Swan
Creek Village Homeowner's Association v. Warne, 134 P.3d 1122 (Utah 2006), the Court
1£

held that technicalities will not preclude enforcement of protective covenants and "the
[homeowners association]'s authority to impose assessments on Swan Creek lot owners
pursuant to the terms of the declarations have been repeatedly ratified by the lot owners
over a period of many years." Id. at 1128.
The court did not err in ruling that Riley Bratt was not qualified as an expert in
this matter and excluding his testimony. Appellant attempted to introduce evidence that
the OHA failed to use a less costly alternative to the installation of the two segmented
block retaining walls by way of having Riley Bratt testify as an expert. Riley Bratt
lacked the requisite qualifications to act as an expert in this matter, including not having
the engineering experience necessary, never seeing the Property prior to completion of
the work, and never having bid a segmented block retaining wall.
Furthermore, in reviewing the evidence presented at trial the court did not err in
granting the OHA's motion for directed verdict as to Appellant's defenses that the OHA
had failed to mitigate its damages, materially breached the Declaration, waived its right
to act pursuant to the Declaration, and breached its implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.
Additionally, the trial court did not err in awarding the OHA pre-judgment interest
and costs, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the OHA its
reasonable attorney fees.
ARGUMENT
I.

Because the OHA has acted as the governing body for over twenty seven (27)
years, the homeowners in the Subdivision have continually ratified its
authority to act as such and no competing associations have emerged the

17

OHA had the authority to impose assessments pursuant to the Declaration.
"Granting summary judgment is appropriate only in the absence of any genuine
issue of material fact and where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Cedar Mtn. Envtl Inc., v. Tooele County, 214 P.3d 95 (Utah 2009); citing S. Utah
Wilderness Alliance v. Automated Geographic Reference Ctr., 200 P.3d 643 (Utah 2008).
Appellate courts grant "no deference to the lower court's legal conclusions and review
them for correctness." Cedar Mtn. Envtl Inc., v. Tooele County, 214 P.3d at 98; quoting
S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Automated Geographic Reference Ctr., 200 P.3d at 649.
The issue is whether a homeowners' association that is called by a different name
than specified in the Declaration, but acts pursuant to the Declaration, has the authority to
enforce the Declaration. Appellant argues, despite the fact that the OHA has acted as the
governing body pursuant to the Declaration for over twenty seven (27) years, that
because the OHA's name is different then the name provided in the Declaration, the
OHA should not have authority to impose all of the provisions of the Declaration, but
only the provisions that Appellant does not object to or individually ratifies. The
Declaration was recorded against the Subdivision and the Property on April 22, 1977.
Appellant admits the Property is subject to the recorded Declaration.
Under Utah case law, Swan Creek Village Homeowner's Association v. Warne,
134 P.3d 1122 (Utah 2006), technicalities will not preclude enforcement of protective
covenants. In Swan Creek, the Homeowner's Association ("HOA") was created and later
disbanded due to bankruptcy. The HOA was not able to reorganize itself within the time
limits required under State law, and therefore, a new HOA was incorporated to enforce

the declarations and covenants of the Swan Creek homes and lots contained within the
subdivision. The new organization was deemed by the court to be authorized to conduct
and govern the actions of the HO A, including the ability to assess fees and collect
amounts unpaid from earlier assessments. Id. at 1124, 1131.
In a case with a very similar fact base, the Utah Supreme Court stated in Swan
Creek that "the [homeowners association]'s authority to impose assessments on Swan
Creek lot owners pursuant to the terms of the declarations have been repeatedly ratified
by the lot owners over a period of many years." Id, at 1128. Using the equitable power of
the courts, the Utah Supreme Court declared the "[homeowner's association in Swan
Creek] to be a valid association authorized to impose assessments pursuant to the terms
of the Declaration." Id, The Utah Supreme Court reached its conclusion stating:
Our equitable powers extend to situations where their invocation is
necessary to correct mistakes and oversights and to protect the public
interest. In the spirit of this principle, we call on our equitable powers to
affirm the HOA's authority to levy assessments here. Where property
owners have treated an association as one with authority to govern and
impose assessments contemplated under the terms of the duly recorded
governing declaration, they ratify its authority to act. Id.
In Swan Creek, the Defendant refused to pay for assessments imposed by the
homeowners' association, but the Court, focusing on the history of the homeowners'
association, almost twenty (20) years acting as the governing body and other lot owners
collectively accepting its management, found that the homeowners' association had the
authority to govern and impose assessments. Id. at 1130. The Swan Creek Court
additionally relied on the fact that "[l]ot owners [had] paid their dues to the HO A, [the
HOA] ha[d] managed the property in Swan Creek, and no competing association ha[d]
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emerged." Id.
Similarly, in the matter at hand, OHA had been acting as the governing body for
the Subdivision for approximately twenty seven (27) years, the other lot owners had
collectively accepted OHA's management of the Subdivision and the lot owners had paid
their dues to the OHA, including Appellant, and OHA managed the Subdivision and no
competing association has emerged. OHA's actions have been accepted, ratified, and
recognized by the lot owners, including Appellant, of the George Osmond Estates.
Moreover, the OHA has collected assessments and enforced the Declaration,
including, but not limited to, the maintenance of the common areas, repair of the entry
gate, and repairs to the roads, sewer lines and storm drains. The actions and authority of
the OHA have been recognized and ratified by the members of the Subdivision as the
appropriate association to conduct neighborhood and "Council" business on their behalf
through the conducting of elections, payment of annual dues, payment of special
assessments, holding of annual meetings, payment of bills related to the common areas,
and maintenance and repair of homes and common areas within the Subdivision.
Appellant admits that (1) the OHA has repaired lawn sprinklers located on the
Property; (2) Earthtec and CKR Engineering conducted geotechnical testing and
engineering on the Property and drafted the plans and specifications for the retaining
walls; (3) Interlock Paving installed the retaining walls on the Property; (4) the amounts
of $2,948.12, $248.87, $29,624.43, and $235.20, were paid by OHA in relation to work
performed on the Property; and (5) the Property is subject to the Declaration.
"[Hjomeowners have an implied-in-fact contract with the association when they buy

property knowing that the association manages it." Perry v. Bridgetown Cmty. Ass 'n,
486 So. 2d 1230, 1234 (Miss. 1986) as quoted by Swan Creek 134 P.3d at 1129.
Appellant benefited from the efforts and authority of OHA to enforce the recorded
Declaration. "It has been repeatedly held that a person by acceptance of benefits may be
estopped from questioning the existence, validity and effect of a contract." Ottenheimer
v. Moutain States Supply Co., 188 P. 1117, 1118 (Utah 1920) as quoted by Swan Creek
134 P.3d at 1129. See also Evergreen Highlands Ass fn v. West, 73 P.3d 1, 7 (Colo. 2003)
(affirmation of homeowners associations under principles of equity.) Appellant
recognized and ratified the authority of the OHA to enforce the recorded Declaration
through his payment of annual and special assessments, attended at least one (1) OHA
meeting and payment of previous repair and maintenance work performed on the
Property.
The OHA has acted as a valid association for over twenty seven (27) years in
which time lot owners have collectively accepted its management. Lot owners have paid
their homeowner dues and assessments to the OHA. The organization has also managed
the common area, and no competing association has emerged. OHA's actions have been
accepted, ratified, and recognized by the lot owners of the Subdivision for over twenty
seven (27) years. The lien placed upon the Property is for expenses arising out of the
repair and maintenance of the Property authorized by the Declaration and for
enforcement of the Declaration.
Additionally, the registration of the OHA as a dba is on file with the State of Utah.
The Declaration has been on file since 1977, prior to Appellant acquiring the Property.
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Appellant's argument rests solely upon technicalities arising from the name of the
homeowners association. The Utah Supreme Court in Swan Creek rejected the
technicality argument and stated, "[t]he availability of equitable relief helps to ensure that
justice is met and prevents parties from avoiding valid obligations due to technicalities.
Particularly in contract cases, we have relied on the principle of ratification to establish
the validity of an act even though certain, express formalities have not been met." Id. at
1129. See also Aggeller & Musser Seed Co. v. Blood, 272 P. 933, 937 (Utah 1928)
(indicating that "acceptance of services rendered with full knowledge of the contract
under which rendered is a ratification of such contract.") The court continued that
ratification can be found where acquiescence or where a duty to disaffirm is not promptly
exercised. Swan Creek 134 P.3d at 1129.
On the other hand, Appellant argues that he made repeated objections that the
OHA did not have the authority to act under the Declaration. However, Appellant admits
that the OHA has authority to "address common concerns, collect homeowner dues, and
pay common expenses . . . ." Since approximately 1979, real property owners within the
Subdivision have collectively accepted that the OHA had the authority to act pursuant to
the Declaration. After Appellant purchased the Property he had actual notice that the
Property was subject to the Declaration and throughout his residency in the Subdivision
he acknowledged and ratified the OHA as acting pursuant to the Declaration by attending
at least one annual meeting, paying annual and special assessments and paying for other
repairs the OHA had made to the Property. Pursuant to Swan Creek, the homeowner
does not have to ratify the actual assessment that has been levied, but the Court will look
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at whether the "HOA's authority to impose assessments . . . pursuant to the terms of the
Declaration has been repeatedly ratified by the lot owners over a period of many years."
Id. at 1128. In the present matter, the lot owners and Appellant have repeatedly ratified
the OHA's authority to impose assessments pursuant to the Declaration.
Because the Court did not err in denying Appellant's Motion for Summary
Judgment and granting the OHA's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court should
deny the Appellant's appeal.
A. The Declaration Allows Individual Lot Owners to Enforce the Declaration.
If the Court finds that the OHA does not have the authority to enforce the
Declaration, the Declaration allows the lot owners within the Subdivision the right to
enforce the Declaration as outlined in § 8.4 Enforcement of Covenants and Restrictions,
of the Declaration which states:
If any person, firm, or corporation shall violate or threaten to violate any of
the provisions of this instrument, it shall be lawful for the Declarant, the
Council, or the Board or for any person, firm or corporation owning land
included within this Declaration, to institute proceedings at law or in equity
to enforce the provisions of this instrument, to restrain the person, firm or
corporation violating or threatening to violate them and to recover
damages, actual and punitive, together with reasonable attorneys' fees, for
such violations or threatened violations. No failure on the part of any such
person, firm or corporation or Declarant to enforce any covenant
immediately after any such cause may arise shall be deemed a waiver as to
that cause or any similar causes that may thereinafter arise.
The intent of the Declaration is clear; the George Osmond Estate's property owners have
acted as a group to enforce the Declaration which protects and benefits their real property
interest. Therefore, because the trial court did not err in holding that the OHA had
authority to act pursuant to the Declaration the Court should deny Appellant's appeal.
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II.

Bratt lacked the requisite qualifications to provide reliable expert testimony
because he was not an engineer, did not see the erosion and hole, and never
bid a block retaining wall previously.
The trial court properly excluded Mr. Bratt's testimony on the grounds that he was

not qualified as an expert witness. The Utah Court of Appeals held, "The trial court has
wide discretion in determining the admissibility of expert testimony, and such decisions
are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Under this standard, we will not
reverse [a decision to admit or exclude expert testimony] unless the decision exceeds the
limits of reasonability." Utah v. Brink, 173 P.3d 183, 184 (2007) (alteration in original)
(quoting State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993)) See also Utah v. Clopten,
2009 UT 84, | 6, (Utah 2009).
A.

Mr. Bratt lacks the qualifications to provide expert testimony as to what
kind of retaining wall or material is necessary to resolve the erosion and
structural issues.

"Utah's rule [regarding testimony by experts] assigns to trial judges a
"gatekeeper" responsibility to screen out unreliable expert testimony. In performing their
gatekeeper function, trial judges should confront proposed expert testimony with
"rationale skepticism." Advisory Committee Note to Rule 702 of the Utah R. of Evid.
Rule 702 states:
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issues, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the
basis for expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles or
methods underlying the testimony meet a threshold showing that they (i)
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are reliable, (ii) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have been
reliably applied to the facts of the case.
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is satisfied if the
principles or methods on which such knowledge is based, including the
sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of their application to the facts
of the case, are generally accepted by the relevant expert community.
According to Rule 702(a) Mr. Bratt does not have the requisite knowledge, skill,
experience, education, or training to testify as an expert in this matter for several reasons,
which support the trial court's decision to exclude his testimony. First, Mr. Bratt is not
an engineer and has no expertise or professional qualification to make a determination as
to what kind of retaining wall is necessary to adequately resolve the safety concerns at
issue. Mr. Bratt testified that his company uses an engineer to help design the stone walls
his company builds. However, Mr. Bratt testified that he did not have the Property
looked at by his engineer before creating his bid, and further that he himself could not tell
the court what the engineer would say would be required for the wall to be built correctly.
Because engineering studies and reports were necessary in order to determine what kind
of retaining wall to install and what material would properly correct the erosion problem,
Mr. Bratt's does not possess the requisite engineering knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education to testify as to whether a rock retaining wall would resolve the
erosion problem, nor was his testimony adequate to be admitted in light of the trial
court's gatekeeper function.
B.

Mr. Bratt never saw the Property prior to the installation of the retaining
walls and back filling of soil.

Second, Mr. Bratt did not see what the conditions were like on the Property prior
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to it being fixed. Mr. Bratt testified at trial that he was asked to prepare a bid by
Appellant, and that he went out for the first time to look at the Property after the retaining
walls were in place and the hole completely filled in. Mr. Bratt then prepared a bid based
on the amount he believed he could have built the retaining wall for, using rock material
instead of segmented block material. Mr. Bratt never saw the hole as it existed before it
was repaired, or the conditions that existed therein. Mr. Bratt5 s conclusions were not
"based upon sufficient facts or data" as required by URE 702(b)(ii).
C.

Mr. Bratt is not able to provide reliable testimony as to the expense of a
block retaining wall because he has never bid a block retaining wall.

Third, Mr. Bratt testified that he had never bid a block wall project (such as was
built in this case). Upon hearing this testimony, the trial court sustained an objection by
OHA, that Mr. Bratt was not qualified to testify as an expert in this matter. Therefore,
because Mr. Bratt's testimony lacks the requisite knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, he may not testify as to scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
(URE 702(a)) and the trial court's decision to exclude his testimony should be upheld.
D.

The trial court's ruling at OHA's motion for summary judgment was not
the law of the case regarding Mr. Bratt; the court may revisit the issue.

Appellant argues that pursuant to the law of the case doctrine that Bratt's
testimony is admissible because the trial court, in its ruling from the bench regarding
OHA's Motion for Summary Judgment, stated, "I believe that the affidavits of Mr.
Landrith and Mr. Bratt put into issue, into dispute the appropriateness of the remedy and
the appropriateness of the expense. . . . I simply believe there's a factual dispute . . . that
cannot be resolved on summary judgment. . . ." April 26, 2007, hearing at pg. 38-39. A
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copy of the pertinent provisions of the April 26, 2007, hearing are attached hereto as
Addendum B.
The trial court did not establish the law of the case during the April 26, 2007
hearing regarding the admissibility and relevancy of Mr. Bratt's affidavit. The court
merely found that there were sufficient genuine factual issues to prevent the resolution on
summary judgment at that time.
Alternatively, the Appellant fails to accurately state the law of the case doctrine.
"Law of the case does not prohibit a district court judge from revisiting a previously
decided issue during the course of a case . . . . Rather, 'the doctrine allows a court to
decline to revisit issues within the same case once the court has ruled on them.5" MidAmerica Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, Inc., 216 P.3d 352, 355 (Utah 2009) (quoting IHC
Health Sews., Inc. v. D & KMgrnt., 2008 UT 36, P 26 (emphasis added)).
Furthermore, the court stated, "[w]hile a case remains pending before the district
court prior to any appeal, the parties are bound by the court's prior decision, but the court
remains free to reconsider that decision. It c do so sua sponte or at the suggestion of one
of the parties." Id. (quoting IHC Health Servs., Inc. at P 27.)
Therefore, the trial court did not make a decision regarding the admissibility or
relevancy of Mr. Bratt's testimony, but if the trial court had, it could reconsider that
decision sua sponte. Because the court did not err in excluding the testimony of Mr.
Bratt, the Court should uphold the trial court's decision.
III.

The evidence presented at trial supports the court's ruling in granting the
OHA's motion for directed verdict regarding Appellant's defenses that the
OHA had failed to mitigate its damages, materially breached the Declaration,
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breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and waiver,
A.

Because the Appellant failed to provide any evidence that a less expensive
alternative to the block retaining wall was reasonable the court did not err
in granting the OHA's motion for directed verdict.

"We review a trial court's grant of directed verdict for correctness. For a directed
verdict to be appropriate, the evidence must be such that reasonable minds could not
differ on the facts based on the evidence presented at trial." Goebel v. Salt Lake City, 104
P.3d 1185, 1190 (Utah 2004); citing Mgmt Comm. of Graystone Pines Homeowners
Ass 'n v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1982). "We examine the
evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party, and if that evidence and the
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom would support a judgment in favor of the losing
party, we must reverse." Goebel, 104 P.3d at 1190.
The trial court did not en' in granting a directed verdict with respect to Appellant's
claim that the OHA failed to mitigate damages. The doctrine of mitigation of damages
prevents a non-offending party from recovering damages "arising from wrongful conduct
which could have been avoided or minimized by reasonable means." Angelos v. First
Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983).
Appellant makes two claims. First, Appellant claims that the OHA refused to
allow Appellant to fix the erosion hole. Second, Appellant claims that the OHA failed to
use a less expensive alternative means to repair the damage and that such a failure was
unreasonable under the circumstances.
Appellant's position with respect to the first claim is contradicted by the factual
record. Appellant asserts that the OHA initially requested that he fill the hole at issue

with dirt; and that when he brought an independent contractor to the Property to discuss
options to repair the erosion and hole on July 23, 2004, a representative of the OHA, Mr.
Anderson, informed him that simply filling the hole was no longer an acceptable solution
to the problem. The factual record sets forth that between 1992 and 1994, a sprinkler
pipe broke on the Property and flooded Appellant's backyard, causing erosion and the
formation of a hole in the ground. From 1994 to 2004 several additional sprinkler pipe
breaks caused additional water to flood the yard, increasing erosion and the size of the
hole.
In 2003, the OHA sent a letter to Appellant requesting that the erosion and hole be
repaired, and reminding Appellant that the OHA had requested that the hole be repaired
throughout the previous five years. In 2003 Appellant moved from the Property, leaving
it vacant with no one to care for it. Appellant testified that he did not take any steps to
remedy the problem while he owned the Property. Beginning in 2003, Mr. Anderson had
multiple discussions with Appellant about the erosion problem and directed that the
problem needed to be fixed. On June 30, 2004, Mr. Anderson called Appellant and
telling him that the OHA would like the hole to be fixed within two months. On July 23,
2004, Mr. Anderson met with Appellant and an independent contractor to discuss
possible repair solutions for the hole on the Property.
On August 28,2004, the OHA informed Appellant that the hole needed to be
repaired and that an engineer would be necessary to properly solve the problem. As
demonstrated by the factual record set forth above, Appellant received, over the space of
approximately six (6) years, multiple notices from the OHA as to the erosion problem, as
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well as demands to fix the problem. By 2004, the problem had reached such severity that
it was no longer an adequate solution to simply fill the hole with dirt. By August 28,
2004, an engineer was needed to inspect and repair the hole in order to adequately deal
with the safety issues that had arisen. Thus, Appellant's claim that the OH A refused to
allow him to repair the hole by filling it with dirt is false. In order to safely and properly
resolve the issue, the professional advice and work of an engineer was required.
Appellant's second claim, that the OHA could have used less expensive means to
repair the hole, is not supported by evidence in the record. Appellant argues that Mr.
Bratt, a supposed expert, testified that the erosion problem could have been resolved
using an alternative method for a cost significantly less than the actual costs incurred.
Appellant's reliance on Mr. Bratt as an expert witness is deficient as outlined above in
Section II. Furthermore, the OHA received engineered plans and drawings
recommending that a segmented block retaining wall system be installed on the Property
to remedy the erosion and hole issues. The Appellant did not provide any evidence that
the cost of the segmented block retaining walls was excessive or that the engineered plans
and drawings were unreasonable to properly fix the erosion and hole.
No evidence was presented to the trial court that the OHA failed to mitigate
damages arising from any wrongful conduct which could have been avoided or
minimized by reasonable means as required under Utah law. The testimony of Mr. Bratt
must be viewed in light of the fact that he was (1) not qualified to testify as an expert; (2)
he was not an engineer; and (3) he created his bid based on an after-the-fact examination
of the site and circumstances and was not based on sufficient facts or data. As such, Mr.

Bratt's testimony was correctly disregarded by the trial court and further the court
properly granted a directed verdict based on the evidence presented. No evidence was
presented upon which reasonable minds would differ in this case.
B.

Because the plans were approved pursuant to the Declaration, reasonable
notice was provided to Appellant, the homeowners ratified the special
assessment and a resolution was not required the court did not err in
granting the OHA's motion for directed verdict.

"We review a trial court's grant of directed verdict for correctness. For a directed verdict
to be appropriate, the evidence must be such that reasonable minds could not differ on the
facts based on the evidence presented at trial." Goebel, 104 P.3d at 1190. "We examine
the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party, and if that evidence and the
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom would support a judgment in favor of the losing
party, we must reverse." Id.
Appellant raises four issues concerning the trial court granting a directed verdict
over Appellant's claim of breach by the OHA. Appellant contends that the OHA
breached the Declaration by (1) failing to approve in writing the plans and specifications
for the two retaining walls; (2) failing to give Appellant notice before entering the
Property and performing any maintenance; (3) assessing a $1,450.00 special assessment
without obtaining consent of 2/3 of the homeowners; and (4) failing to adopt a resolution
authorizing construction of the retaining walls. None of the issues raised by Appellant
constitute a "material breach" by the OHA.
Whether a breach is material or not is a question of fact to be decided by the jury,
unless the facts are undisputed, in which case, it is a question of law for the court.
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Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Utah App. Ct. 1997). Further, the Utah
Supreme Court has held:
As a general proposition, a party to a contract has a right to rescission and
an action for restitution as an alternative to an action for damages where
there has been a material breach of the contract by the other party. What
constitutes so serious a breach as to justify rescission is not easily reduced
to precise statement, but certainly, a failure of performance which "defeats
the very object of the contract" or is of such prime importance that the
contract would not have been made if default in that particular had been
contemplated" is a material failure.
Id. citing Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d449, 451 (Utah 1979).
i.

The OHA did not materially breach the Declaration regarding the
approval of the plans by requesting the production of the plans and
thereafter waiving its right to approve or disapprove the plans.

Appellant relies on Article III, Section 3.3 of the Declaration, for its conclusion
that written approval of the OHA was required. Section 3.3 states as follows:
Approval of Plan. No building, outbuilding, fence, wall, or other
improvements that are not already located on such property shall be
constructed, erected or maintained, nor shall any additions thereto, or
alteration therein, be made until plans and specifications showing design,
color, location, materials, landscaping, and such other information relating
to such improvement as the Board may reasonably require shall have been
submitted to and approved by the Board in writing.
Section 3.5 of the Declaration further states the criteria that the OHA
shall consider in approving plans and specifications for alterations. Such criteria include:
reviewing professional services and documents provided by architectural and engineering
advisors; design documents, showing the structure and materials proposed to be used;
construction documents showing the drawings and specifications proposed for
construction; and generally, that any improvement will not impair the monetary and
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aesthetic value of the property. The purpose of Article III of the Declaration is to ensure
that homeowners do not make improvements to their property without the permission of
the OHA. Specifically, this Section grants power to the OHA to review the proposed
improvements in all respects in order to determine whether such improvements will
negatively affect the property or other homeowners. It does not apply to improvements
by OHA.
Article III, Section 3.6 of the Declaration provides a provision of waiver under
which the written approval of the OHA is not required to approve or disapprove plans
and specifications submitted for repairs and improvements. Section 3.6 provides:
Effect of the Board's Failure to Act. In the event the Board fails to approve
or disapprove plans and specification documents submitted to it within
thirty (30) days of submission, no extension of time has been required, and
no suit to enjoin the construction has been commenced prior to the
completion thereof, approval shall not be required and the related covenants
shall be determined to have been fully complied with
Pursuant to the Declaration, the OHA is not required to approve plans in writing as
suggested by Appellant. The OHA's choice not to approve in writing plans submitted by
a homeowner simply removes authority from the OHA to later deny the homeowner the
right to move forward with the improvements or repairs. In this case, the plans submitted
to the OHA were not submitted by Appellant; rather the OHA acted of its own authority
to hire an engineer to begin inspection and repair of the Property. Therefore, the OHA's
failure to provide written approval of the plans was not a material breach of the
Declaration. The OHA acquiesced to the plans submitted by allowing the work to go
forward.
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Furthermore, the facts in this case are not that a homeowner desired to and sought
permission to construct a wall for the improvement of the property. The opposite is true
- Appellant refused to fix an erosion problem despite over six (6) years of notices and
requests to do so by the OHA. During this period, the problem worsened to the point that
it became a serious safety hazard needing immediate attention.
The factual record indicates that the structural integrity of retaining walls
surrounding the hole were in jeopardy due to the lack of maintenance and care by
Appellant. Specifically, the railroad tie retaining wall next to and above the erosion hole
had partially collapsed into the hole. A retaining wall on the east side of the Property
separating the Property from another parcel had begun to settle, causing a six to eight (68) inch crack in the wall. Had the hole not been repaired, this wall was in danger of
collapsing and causing significant property damage. Additionally, a tree next to the hole
had been undermined by the erosion to the point that it was leaning at a precarious angle
resulting in a safety hazard.
Due to such safety concerns, the OHA, of its own initiative, sought out a
professional engineer to assess the problem, and paid for the necessary repairs.
Section 6.11 of the Declaration states as follows:
Exterior Maintenance. In addition to maintenance upon the Common Area,
the Council may provide exterior maintenance upon each Parcel which is
subject to assessment under this Article VI hereof, as follows: paint, repair,
replace and care for roofs, gutters, downspouts, exterior building surfaces,
trees, shrubs, grass walks, and other exterior improvements.
Pursuant to this Section, the OHA is granted authority to provide exterior
maintenance and other exterior improvements upon the property of homeowners for
1A

necessary repairs. The repairs to Appellant's property were necessary. The hazards
existing thereon due to Appellant's lack of care and maintenance as required under the
Declaration, jeopardized not only Appellant's property but adjacent properties as well.
The OHA reviewed the plans presented by the engineer and directed the effort to make
the necessary repairs and improvements to ensure the safety and upkeep of the Property.
Appellant did not make a request for the OHA to approve, the OHA acted of its own
accord under the authority granted to it in the Declaration.
Therefore, the OHA's failure to approve in writing its own recommendations does
not constitute a material breach of the Declaration. Additionally, pursuant to Section 3.6
of the Declaration, as set forth above, the OHA may choose not to give formal written
approval of plans for repairs and improvements. The OHA's choice to refrain from giving
written approval does not prevent the repairs and improvements from being undertaken.
Therefore, the trial court appropriately granted directed verdict as to this issue?
ii.

The OHA provided Appellant with sufficient notice prior to entering
the Property and performing maintenance.

The factual record indicates that Appellant was well aware of the OHA's plan to
make the necessary repairs to the Property. The record provides as follows:
•

On July 23, 2004, Mr. Anderson met with Appellant and an independent
contractor to discuss possible repair solutions for the hole on the Property.

•

On August 28, 2004, Mr. Anderson spoke to Appellant about fixing the hole on
the Property and that an engineer and permit would be needed. Mr. Anderson
also agreed to look into the cost of an engineer's services.
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•

On the 2 and 3 of November 2004, Mr. Anderson spoke to Steve Smith, an
engineer with Earthtec, regarding the Property, erosion and the hole.

•

On November 3, 2004, Mr. Anderson relayed his discussion with Steve Smith
to Appellant regarding repairing the Property.

Moreover, Mr. Anderson, kept a contemporaneous log documenting the
communications made and the steps taken by the OHA to remedy the erosion problem.
The log notes specific dates on which various communications and notices were sent to
Appellant through the mail. There is no dispute that such notices were mailed to
Appellant. Further, the log also indicates that various phone calls were made to
Appellant. Based on such evidence, the trial court correctly granted directed verdict on
the notice issue.
Furthermore, Appellant was informed of the OHA's plan to move forward with
repair of the Property, and the OHA attempted to have Appellant involved with the
process of selecting a professional engineering company to begin the initial studies and
reports and the eventual work to be performed.

As noted above, the safety concerns on

the Property were such that moving forward with repairs quickly was critical.
Appellant's contention that he had no reasonable notice before the OHA authorized
engineering and construction work to be performed on the Property is false. Appellant
received numerous requests to make repairs to the Property, and more importantly was
notified, by letters and phone calls, of the OHA's plans to make the necessary repairs.
Notice was given; the OHA did not materially breach the covenants of the Declaration.

iii.

The OHA did not materially breach the Declaration by imposing a
$1,450.00 repair and construction fee upon the homeowners.

The OHA received all homeowners', excepting Appellant's, consent to be
assessed $1,450.00, and a two-thirds (2/3) approving vote was not required to impose the
$1,450.00 assessment.
Section 6.4 of the Declaration provides:
Special Assessments for Capital Improvements. In addition to the annual
assessments authorized by Section 6.3 hereof, the Board of Managers of the
Council may levy a special assessment for the purpose of defraying, in
whole or in part, the cost of any construction or reconstruction, unexpected
repair or replacement of any capital improvements upon the Common
Area, including the necessary fixtures and personal property related
thereto, provided that any such assessment shall have the assent of twothirds (2/3) of the votes of the Council who are voting in person or by
proxy at a meeting duly called for this purpose, written notice of which
shall be sent to all members at least thirty (30) days in advance and shall set
forth the purpose of the meeting, (emphasis added)
Appellant asserts that the OHA failed to hold a meeting or conduct a vote to
authorize the construction of the retaining walls on the Property or to levy the $1,450.00
assessment to fund the construction. Appellant's argument correctly cites that Utah
Courts and statutes recognize the governing documents between an association and its
members as valid contractual agreements.
Appellant cites Section 6.4 of the Declaration requiring a two-thirds (2/3)
approving vote of the Council for special assessments imposed for "repair or replacement
of any capital improvements upon the Common Area..." (emphasis added) While
correctly stating the standard, Appellant's reliance on this Section is misplaced. The trial
court determined that the improvements, repairs and construction performed by the OHA
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were not "capital improvements" and were not made upon the "Common Area." No
evidence was presented that the repairs made were "capital improvements" or made on
common area. The repairs and improvements made do not constitute capital
improvements and were not made on common area, but on the Property. Consequently,
the requirements of Section 6.4 requiring a two-thirds (2/3) approval of the homeowners
to make such repairs does not apply.
Moreover, Utah Courts have consistently and recently held, "[w]here property
owners have treated an association as one with authority to govern and impose
assessments.. .they ratify its authority to act." Swan Creek 134 P.3d at 1128.
In Swan Creek, the Supreme Court of Utah applied the doctrine of ratification to
declare that a homeowners association was authorized to impose assessments even
though the original association contemplated under the Declaration was no longer in
existence. Id. The Court agreed that the record failed to establish any formal amendment
of the Declaration recognizing the new HOA; and that there were valid disputes as to
whether a majority of the lot owners formally approved the substitution of the HOA
following the involuntary dissolution of the original. Id. The Court however, found such
facts to be "not material" because the Declaration had been repeatedly ratified by the lot
owners. Id. at 1128-29. The Court flirther cited Lowe v. April Indus., Inc., 531 P.2d 1297,
1299 (Utah 1974) for the conclusion that ratification has been found "under
circumstances of acquiescence or where a duty to disaffirm is not promptly exercised."
In this case, all of the members of the homeowners association, except Appellant,
paid their proportionate share of the costs associated with the construction of the
1R

retaining walls. The power of the OHA under the Declaration to impose special
assessments on homeowners for just such costs is undisputed. However, Appellant
argues that the OHA's procedural steps were inadequate pursuant to the Declaration and
therefore a material breach has occurred. The doctrine of ratification applies under the
facts of this case, much as it did in Swan Creek. Here, all of the homeowners accepted
the authority of the OHA to assess the costs of repair and construction, indicating their
approval of the plans and work to be done. The OHA has acted as a valid association for
over twenty seven (27) years. During that time period, the homeowners have regularly
paid their dues and accepted the OHA's authority to act on behalf of the best interest of
the homeowners. The homeowners have ratified the OHA's authority to act. The fact
that the OHA did not conduct a meeting and receive a formal two-thirds (2/3) approval of
the members of the association is not a breach and certainly not a material breach of the
Declaration where the homeowners have ratified the OHA's action by paying the
assessment and acquiesced to its authority.
iv.

The OHA not adopting a resolution authorizing construction of the
retaining walls did not materially breach the Declaration.

Appellant asserts that the OHA did not adopt a resolution authorizing the
construction of the two retaining walls, the imposition of $1,450.00 in special assessment,
or establishing a due date for payment of such assessments. As such, Appellant argues
that the OHA has materially breached the Declaration provisions.
No resolution is required by the Declaration. As noted above, the assessment
imposed by the OHA does not fall within the confines of Section 6.4. Section 6.6, relied
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on by Appellant for the conclusion that a resolution was necessary, states in relevant part,
"The due date of any special assessments under Section 6.4 hereof shall be fixed in the
resolution authorizing such assessment." Because the assessments at issue do not
constitute "capital improvements," upon "Common Area" under Section 6.4, the
resolution requirement of Section 6.6 also does not apply.
Furthermore, the doctrine of ratification applies to the facts in this case. The fact
that a resolution was not drafted to address such issues is immaterial. The homeowners5
unanimous ratification of the special assessment, excepting the Appellant, resolves the
issue. The issue, whether or not a resolution was drafted following an official vote by the
OHA, did not in any way "defeat the object of the contract" or cause the homeowners to
consider whether the OHA's actions were inappropriate. The costs of construction were
readily accepted as valid by the homeowners. Under the circumstance, the failure to draft
a resolution as required in the Declaration is not a material breach. The trial court
appropriately granted directed verdict as to this issue.
C.

Because the OHA provided reasonable notice and acted pursuant to the
Declaration in remedying the erosion issues, the court did not err in
granting the OHA's motion for directed verdict.

"We review a trial court's grant of directed verdict for correctness. For a directed verdict
to be appropriate, the evidence must be such that reasonable minds could not differ on the
facts based on the evidence presented at trial." Goebel, 104 P.3d at 1190. "We examine
the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party, and if that evidence and the
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom would support a judgment in favor of the losing
party, we must reverse." Id.
AC)

Appellant contends that the OHA's actions, specifically, not allowing Appellant to
simply fill the hole on the Property, and hiring an engineer to inspect the Property and to
repair the damage caused by the erosion hole were inconsistent with its implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing. In support of this argument Appellant argues that a jury
could have found that the engineering and construction work performed was not the
product of reasonable safety concerns by the OHA, but rather an act of personal
retaliation by Mr. Anderson, a member of the OHA, against Appellant. The factual
record is void of any evidence that Mr. Anderson had a personal vendetta against
Appellant. Conversely, the record is full of evidence (e.g., pictures, testimony, etc.) that
the erosion hole on the Property was a serious safety hazard. The trial court, in ruling on
the issue for directed verdict pointed to testimony and pictures indicating that the depth of
the hole at the time it was repaired was six to eight (6-8) feet deep. Further the hole
contained dangerous items such as a tree, shrubbery and even an air conditioning unit.
Under such conditions, the trial court appropriately exercised its equitable powers to rule
that the OHA was not acting outside of its authority in entering the Property and taking
steps necessary to remedy the dangers. Such action by the OHA was well within the
boundaries of good faith and fair dealing.
Appellant contends that an agreement was reached between himself and Mr.
Anderson that no further repairs would be made to the Property without Appellant's
consent or knowledge. Appellant's argument is irrelevant to the issue. The factual
record indicates that Appellant was given notice by letter and phone messages of the
repairs to be done. No evidence was presented by Appellant that would raise a question
41

of "material fact" for the jury to consider with regard to the OHA's good faith and fair
dealing with Appellant. The OHA acted in good faith in moving forward with the repairs
of dangerous conditions on the Property and directed verdict was appropriate.
D.

Because the OHA acted pursuant to the Declaration and Appellant failed to
present evidence that the OHA waived its ability to enforce the Declaration,
the court did not err in granting the OHA's motion for directed verdict.

"We review a trial court's grant of directed verdict for correctness. For a directed
verdict to be appropriate, the evidence must be such that reasonable minds could not
differ on the facts based on the evidence presented at trial.55 Goebel, 104 P.3d at 1190.
"We examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party, and if that
evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom would support a judgment in
favor of the losing party, we must reverse.55 Id.
Appellant raises the argument that the OHA has waived its authority to act under
the Declaration, because in 1977 the George Osmond Estates Council was organized but
that the OHA did not operate pursuant to the Declaration. Specifically, Appellant notes
that the OHA did not incorporate as a non-profit corporation, did not adopt any
organizing document granting voting rights, did not give copies of its Articles of
Incorporation to new purchasers, and did not assess one-half (Yi) of the annual
assessments on the due dates provided in the Declaration. Appellant thus argues that a
fact finder could have found that the OHA waived its authority to act pursuant to the
Declaration and that a directed verdict was not appropriate.
Appellant did not provide any evidence supporting his argument that the OHA
waived the ability to act pursuant to the Declaration. Furthermore, the doctrine of
/10

ratification provides authority for the issue to be set aside by directed verdict. The
Supreme Court has recently addressed and affirmed a trial court's ability to use its
equitable powers in favor of a homeowners association when the circumstances are
appropriate. In Swan Creek, the Court held that where "property owners have treated an
association as one with authority to govern.. .they ratify its authority to act." Id. 134 P.3d
at 1128. In this case, the authority of the OHA to act on behalf of the homeowners is
well documented. The OHA has acted pursuant to its authority for over twenty seven
(27) years. The homeowners have regularly paid their dues and accepted the OHA's
authority during that period of time. Further, the homeowners unanimously accepted the
OHA's levy of costs for construction in the case at hand, paying their proportionate share
of the costs of the work performed. Therefore, Appellant's argument fails under scrutiny
of the factual record and the evidence presented in this case; the trial court appropriately
granted directed verdict on the issue of waiver.
IV,

Prejudgment interest id determined pursuant to the Declaration which
requires expenses incurred by the OHA in providing exterior maintenance
are added to the homeowner's annual dues.
m

A trial court's decision to grant or deny prejudgment interest presents a question

of law which we review for correctness.'" Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d 1064
(Utah 2003) (quoting Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995)).
The trial court appropriately determined the amount of prejudgment interest to
award the OHA pursuant to the standards and evidence presented in this case.
Appellant argues that the prejudgment interest awarded by the trial court was
calculated incorrectly. Specifically, Appellant notes the interest accrued on past due
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exterior maintenance costs should have been calculated as of the date (month) of
delinquency as opposed to the date (month) on which the debt was incurred (i.e., the date
of the invoices). In making this argument, Appellant used the wrong date from which
interest began to accrue.
The standard for determining and calculating interest rates in a transaction
between parties is controlled by statute.
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 provides:
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for the loan
or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the subject of their
contract.
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the legal
rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action
shall be 10% per annum.
Utah Code Ann § 70A-3-112 further provides:
(1) Unless otherwise provided in the instrument, an instrument is not payable with
interest, and interest on an interest-bearing instrument is payable front the date of
the instrument, (emphasis added).
The foregoing provisions dictate that parties to an agreement are free to negotiate
their own rate of interest outside the confines of Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1. Where parties
have done so pursuant to a "lawful contract" the Court should look to the contract to
determine the percentage rate to apply in calculating prejudgment interest payments, and
the date at which such interest begins to accrue.
Section 6.8 of the Declaration, sets forth the effect of non-payment of an
assessment. It states in relevant part, "[i]f the assessments are not paid on the date when
due (being the dates specified in Section 6.6 hereof), then such assessments shall become

delinquent..." Section 6.6 of the Declaration provides in relevant part that "[t]he annual
assessments provided herein shall be payable in semi-annual installments (1/2 the annual
assessment) on the first day of each January and July of each year." Further, Section 6.8
of the Declaration states, "[i]f the assessment is not paid within thirty (30) days after the
delinquency date, the assessment shall bear interest from the date of delinquency at the
rate often percent (10%) per annum..." (emphasis added). Thus, the "delinquency date"
or the date upon which payment of the annual assessment becomes delinquent is the due
date (i.e., January 1 and July 1 of each year), provided payment is not made within 30
days of such date.
The owner of each parcel, by accepting a deed for such parcel, is required to pay
an annual assessment. Declaration § 6.1. Pursuant to §§ 6.11 and 6.12 of the Declaration,
exterior maintenance costs are "added to and become a part of the annual assessment..."
and become due and payable in all respects as annual assessments, as indicated above.
Therefore, the exterior maintenance costs at issue in this case qualify as "assessments."
In the present case, charges for exterior maintenance were incurred by Appellant
during 2005 and 2006. Pursuant to the Declaration, such costs became a part of the
annual assessment due during those years. The uncontested factual record indicates that
Appellant failed to pay his annual assessments for 2005 and 2006, which included the
cost for exterior maintenance repairs. As such, interest began to accrue, under the
provisions of the Declaration as noted above, as of the dates of delinquency; in this case,
January 1, 2005, July 1, 2005, January 1, 2006, and July 1, 2006, respectively. The
interest continued to accrue on these unpaid costs through December 31, 2008 for a total
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accrued interest cost of $12,369.77. However, the trial court calculated and awarded
interest to the OHA based upon the invoice dates of the exterior maintenance and not
from the earlier dates provided for in the Declaration. Thus, the calculated amount in the
Judgment (With Revised Calculation of Interest) was $10,627.75, a saving to Appellant
of $2,925.88. OHA accepted the amount awarded by the trial court.
Appellant contends that interest should not have begun to accrue until January 1,
2006 and July 1, 2006, respectively. Appellant's calculation wrongly applies the exterior
maintenance costs incurred in 2005 to the 2006 annual assessment costs. A careful
reading of the Declaration however, indicates that the exterior maintenance costs incurred
during 2005 are due as part of the 2005 annual assessment. Likewise, the maintenance
costs incurred during 2006 are due as part of the 2006 annual assessment. Thus,
Appellant's argument is without merit. The trial court appropriately calculated and
awarded prejudgment interest to the OHA, despite the fact that it could have awarded a
greater amount pursuant to the Declaration.
V.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding all litigation expenses.
A trial court's decision to award the prevailing party its costs will be reviewed

under an abuse of discretion standard. Jensen v. Sawyers, 130 P.3d 325, 351 (Utah 2005);
see also Young v. State, 16 P.3d 549 (Utah 2000).
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d) states: "Except when express provision therefore is made
either in a statute of this state or in these rales, costs shall be allowed as of course to the
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs..." In Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d
771 (Utah 1980) the Court held that the generally accepted rule is that costs "means those
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fees which are required to be paid to the court and to witnesses, and for which the statutes
authorize to be included in the judgment.55 Id. at 774.
Utah courts have distinguished between "legitimate and taxable 'costs5 and other
'expenses5 of litigation which may be ever so necessary, but are not taxable as costs.55
Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Frampton, 605
P.2d at 774). Specifically, the Morgan Court held that "witness fees, travel expenses and
service of process expenses are chargeable55 as costs but "only in accordance with the fee
schedule set by statute.55 Id. at 686-87. The court in Stevensen 3rd East, LC v. Watts, 210
P.3d 977, 993 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) further held that recovery for the following litigation
expenses is not allowed: lands surveys, accounting fees, and appraisal fees (citing
Morgan, 795 P.2d at 687); trial exhibits (citing Young v. State, 16 P.3d 554); contour
models, photographs, and certified copies of documents (citing Frampton, 605 P.2d at
774); photocopying costs (citing Chase v. Scott, 38 P.3d 1001, 1006 (Utah Ct. App.
2001); and any amount paid over a statutory allowance for witnesses, travel, or service of
process fees (citing Young, 16 P.3d at 549).
In the dispute at hand, Appellant objected to $403.82 of the costs claimed by the
OHA. The OH A, in its response to Appellant's objections noted, without agreeing that
there should be a reduction, that it would accept a reduction of costs in the amount of
$329.89. This amount consisted of costs for postage to mail initial disclosures, certified
copies of a request for hearing and minutes of hearing, copies of deposition, Expert
Witness - Conrad Guymon from CKR Engineers, Inc., copies of Declaration on
Protective Covenants from the Utah County Recorder's Office, and additional copies of
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various documents. The OH A did not agree however to a reduction in costs for copies of
George Landrith's Deposition ($73.93), as deposition costs are valid taxable costs
pursuant to Utah law. Frampton, 605 P.3d at 774. The trial court in its judgment awarded
the OHA the full amount of the costs notwithstanding the OHA's willingness to reduce
the amount of such costs as noted above. Thus, OHA was awarded the $403.82 objected
to by Appellant.
VI.

The court did not abuse its discretion in awarding reasonable attorneys' fees
to OHA for fees that were reasonably incurred.
"Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound discretion of the trial

court, and will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of
discretion." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988); see also In re
Estate ofQuinn, 830 P.2d 282 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) citing Turtle Mgmt, Inc. v. Haggis
Mgmt, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982)).
The attorney fees awarded by the trial court are reasonable pursuant to the
standards set forth by Utah Courts. The Supreme Court of Utah has established that a
trial court's award of attorney fees must be supported by evidence in the record, DixieState Bank, 764 P.2d at 988, citing Associated Indust. Dev., Inc. vJewkes, 701 P.2d 486,
488 (Utah 1984). The Utah Court of Appeals has further concluded that "[a]n abuse of
discretion will be found, and a fee award reversed, only if the trial court's determination
of reasonableness is unsupported by evidence in the record. In re Estate ofQuinn, 830
P.2d at 285. Notwithstanding the requirement that the trial court's award be supported by
evidence in the record, the Supreme Court has held that where a party did not present

evidence concerning the reasonableness of attorney fees at trial, the trial court did not
commit error in declining to make an award. Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica Inc.,
657 P.2d 743, 750-751 (Utah 1982). Further, when the evidence supporting the trial
court's award is in dispute the trial court is required to make findings of fact supporting
the reasonableness of its award. In re Estate ofQuinn, 830 P.2d at 285-86.
In Dixie State Bank, the Court set forth practical considerations to be reviewed by
a trial court in making a reasonableness determination, specifically noting that:
in exercising its discretion to determine the reasonableness of an attorney fee
award, the trial court should find answers to four questions:
1. What legal work was actually performed?
2. How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to adequately
prosecute the matter?
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily charged in the
locality for similar services?
4. Are there circumstances which require consideration of additional factors,
including those listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility?"
Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 990.
In this case, the trial court awarded reasonable attorneys' fees based on the
Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees submitted by counsel for the OHA. This Affidavit set forth
and established evidence that OHA's attorneys' fees were reasonable and necessary.
Appellant failed to provide any evidence to the trial court as to what the correct amount
of attorneys' fees should be or as to what constituted unreasonable attorneys' fees
awarded to the OHA.
Appellant did provide several examples of what he felt were unreasonable fees for
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services rendered in his Objection to Form of Judgment, specifically noting several
instances where more than one attorney was present at hearings, pre-trial conferences,
meetings with Appellant's counsel, depositions, and at trial. Appellant asserted in his
Objection that he should not be charged for such "duplication of services," and that such
charges are unreasonable. In its appellate brief, Appellant comments on a single and
separate example, asserting that OHA inappropriately billed time for Aaron Lancaster, a
"new attorney in training," who attended the full trial, but did not conduct an
examination. While Appellant's assertion may provide a reason for the court to examine
the "evidence" and factual record carefully, such assertions do not in and of themselves
constitute "evidence". Appellant did not present any evidence, documentation or proof
to the trial court in support of its claims. Conversely, the OHA provided detailed
evidence by Affidavit as to the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees assessed. Therefore,
the trial court did not commit error in failing to grant Appellant's objections where
Appellant did not provide any evidence in support thereof. The only evidence submitted
to the court as to the reasonableness of attorneys' fees was provided by the OHA. Thus
the trial court made an appropriate award of attorneys' fees based upon its review of the
evidentiary record before it.
Appellant further argues for the conclusion that courts have held an award of
attorneys' fees unreasonable where a firm charged fees for the time of a recently
graduated law student who attended trial for the purpose of being trained. While the
general rule is that duplication of services should ordinarily not be taxable as attorneys'
fees, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has stated with respect to
so

charging attorneys5 fees that "the presence of more than two lawyers during trial or the
presence of more than one lawyer at depositions and hearings must be justified to the
court." Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 554 (1983). In other words, the presence of two
attorneys at trial is justifiable. However the court further noted that fees should not be
awarded for hours reported by lawyers attending trial who are there for the purpose of
being trained and do not otherwise participate in the trial. Id.
Appellant asserts only one example of unreasonable attorneys' fees awarded by
the trial court - the payment of fees for the presence of Aaron Lancaster, a second
attorney, during the trial. Under the rule set forth in Ramos, the presence of two
attorneys at trial is not unreasonable and does not require further explanation to the trial
court. However, Appellant asserts that Thomas Seiler indicated to the jury that Aaron
Lancaster was a "very new" attorney and he was there to "learn right along with" the
jury. Thus, Appellant claims that Aaron Lancaster was admittedly being trained and that
an award of attorneys5 fees for his presence at trial was unreasonable. Outside of
Appellant's reference to Thomas Seller's comment that Aaron Lancaster was a young
attorney, Appellant provided no evidence that would justify overruling the trial court's
judgment that the attorney fees awarded were reasonable. Aaron Lancaster had been
licensed to practice law in Nevada since October of 2006 and in Utah since May of 2007,
and he actively participated in the OHA's preparation for trial, including drafting trial
documents, preparing witnesses, drafting direct and cross-examination questions,
assisting Thomas Seiler with his preparation for trial and discussing case strategy during
the trial. Contrary to Appellant's contention, Aaron Lancaster has been an active
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participant in nearly every aspect of this case. Appellant did not provide any evidence to
the trial court that OHA's services were unreasonable. Without evidence, the trial court
could not take notice of Appellant's objections, and therefore did not err in awarding
attorney fees based upon the evidence on record.
Appellant additionally argues that because the trial court did not set forth separate
findings of fact as to the reasonableness of the fees claimed by the OH A, the award was
unreasonable. While the trial court did not specifically designate a "findings of facts"
section in its Judgment, the court did state that the attorney fees award was "reasonable."
Specifically, the Court stated:
Judgment shall enter in this matter in favor of the Plaintiff and against the
Defendants as follows:

c.

Attorney's fees reasonably incurred in this matter in the amount of

$59,831.00.
In Cabrera v. Conrell, 694 P.2d 622 (1985) the Utah Supreme Court noted the trial court
"did not enter separate findings of fact and conclusions of law, at least denominated as
such. However the order and judgment did contain findings of fact and legal conclusions,
including the finding that the award was reasonable." Id. at 625. The trial court in this
case similarly found and stated that the fees awarded were reasonable. The trial court
relied upon the OHA's Affidavit, which was the only evidence on record concerning the
issue, to reach its conclusion.
In In re Estate ofQuinn, the Court noted that where parties dispute the "evidence

addressed to the issue" in the record (i.e., the facts establishing the evidence), the Court is
required to set forth factual findings in support of its award of attorney's fees. 830 P.2d
at 285-86. Appellant made no argument as to the factual record established by the OHA
in its request for attorney fees. Nevertheless, Appellant would have the Court apply the
same rule to the issue at hand, where the factual evidentiary record is not in dispute.
Appellant's claim is an errant mischaracterization of the rule as stated above. The factual
record clearly and uncontrovertibly supports the trial court's award. Therefore, under the
highly deferential standard of abuse of discretion, the court's declaration that the fees
awarded the OHA were reasonable should withstand review.
Without evidence, the trial court could not take notice of Appellant's objections,
and therefore did not err in awarding attorney fees based upon the evidence on record.
VIII. Appellee is entitled to an award of attorney fees if successful in defending the
appeal while the Appellant, if successful on appeal, is not so entitled.
The issue is whether the prevailing party on appeal is entitled to reasonable
attorney fees incurred on appeal. The general rule is that "[a]n award of fees on appeal
requires both a fee award below and success in the appellate court." Holladay Towne
Center, LLC v. Brown Family Holdings, LC, 198 P.3d 990, 997 (Utah Ct. App. 2008).
The majority of the Utah Court of Appeals in Robertson *s Marine, Inc. v. 14 Solutions,
Inc., 2010 UT App 9, P18, (2010), parted from the general rule, by stating that this matter
has "unique circumstances" and allowed a party that was not awarded attorney fees by
the district court to recover fees incurred in defending an appeal. Id. The Court reasoned
that its departure from the general rule was because "if it was not for the attendant
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circumstances that Robertson had brought its own unsuccessM breach of contract claim,
Robertson would have been entitled to an award of attorney fees below for defeating 14's
. . . claim." Id. at P19. Judge Bench opined in his dissent that, "[ujnless the majority can
conclude that the district court abused its discretion in determining that Robertson was
the prevailing [internal citation omitted] party below, it should not award Robertson
attorney fees on appeal." Id. at P25.
In the matter at hand, Appellant was neither awarded attorney fees by the trial
court nor were there unique circumstances, i.e., a separate cause of action that he was
unsuccessful on, that would entitle Appellant to receive an award of attorney fees if
successful on appeal. Therefore, the general rule should apply that "requires both a fee
award below and success in the appellate court" in order for the prevailing party to be
awarded attorney fees. Id. at P24.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant's appeal should be denied. Based on the factual record which
clearly demonstrates that the OHA has acted as the governing body pursuant to the
Declaration for over twenty seven (27) years, the homeowners in the Subdivision have
collectively accepted the OHA's authority to act pursuant to the Declaration and that no
competing association has emerged the trial court did not err in ruling that the OHA had
the authority to act pursuant to the Declaration. The trial court correctly found that Riley
Bratt lacked the requisite knowledge, skill, experience, education, or training to testify as
an expert regarding the reasonable alternative methods to resolve the erosion issue. Mr.
Bratt was not an engineer, did not see the erosion prior to the installation of the retaining

walls, and he had never bid a block retaining wall.
The trial court did not err in granting the OHA's motion for directed verdict as to
Appellant's defenses that the OHA had failed to mitigate its damages, materially
breached the Declaration, breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
and that the OHA waived its authority to enforce the Declaration. Appellant failed to
provide evidence where reasonable minds could not differ as to Appellant's raised
defenses. Furthermore, the trial court did not err in awarding the OHA all pre-judgment
interest requested pursuant to the Declaration, litigation expenses, and reasonable
attorneys' fees.
The judgment entered by the lower court in favor of the Appellee should stand.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this //*&

day of February, 2010.

ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC

THOMAS%T^£ER
AARON D. LANCASTER
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee
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ADDENDUM A - DECLARATION OF PROTECTIVE COVENANTS
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DECLARATION OF PROTECTIVE COVENANTS
This Declaration of Protective Covenants and Restrictions i s
made this 19th day of A p r i l , 1977, by FLYING DIAMOND DEVELORHENT CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation, hereinafter called "Declarant."
WITNESSES:
WHEREAS, Declar&nt is the owner of the real property
described
in Article II hereof (herein called the "Property") and desires to
create George Osmond E s t a t e s , a Subdivision consisting of a r e s i d e n t i a l
area for single family dwellings, s t r e e t s , sidewalks, medians and other
related f a c i l i t i e s for the benefit of a common buildi'ng scheme (herein
collectively designated as Georqe Osmond Estates); and
WHEREAS, Declarant has deemed 1t necessary and d e s i r a b l e , for
the welfare of the inhabitants of George Osmond Estates and the preservation
of i t s values, to suhject said real property to the covenants, r e s t r i c t i o n s ,
easements, charges, assessments and liens hereinafter set f o r t h , which
covenants, r e s t r i c t i o n s , easements, charges, assessments and liens s h a l l
be burdens and benefits to Declarant, i t s respective successors and
assigns and grantees, and t h e i r successors, h e i r s , executors, administ r a t o r s , devisees, grantees or assigns; and
WHEREAS, Declarant hereby desires to create c e r t a i n aqencies
to which should be delegated and assigned the powers and duties of
maintaining and administering the common properties and a r e a s , and
administering and enforcing the covenants and restrictions
and c o l l e c t i n g
and disbursing the assessments and charges hereafter created;
NOW THEREFORE, the Declarant declares that the real property
described in Article II hereof i s and shall be held, t r a n s f e r r e d , s o l d ,
occupied, and conveyed subject to the covenants, r e s t r i c t i o n s , easements,
charges and liens (sometimes referred to as "covenants and r e s t r i c t i o n s " )
hereinafter set forth, sa'.d covenants and r e s t r i c t i o n s being covenants
real which shall run with the land and be considered to be included in
all conveyances, t r a n s f e r s , and leases of any part of said land described
in Article II hereof, whether or not specifically mentioned t h e r e i n .
ARTICLE I
Section 1.1 Definitions. The following words when used in
this Declaration or in any Supplemental Declaration (unless inconsistent
with the context hereof) shall have the following meaning:
A.
"Board" means the George Osmond Estates Architectural
and Planning Control Board as hereinafter established.
B.
"Builder" means any person at whose direction construction
or reconstruction of a residential house is accomplished,
whether by direct labor and material or through a contractor
or subcontractor.
C"Council" means the George Osmond Estates Council, a
Utah non-stock, non-profit membership corporation to be orqanized
to provide certain facilities and services to the community
and its inhabitants and visitors.
D.
"Common Area" means those portions of the Property
specified on the Plat, including the Drivate road.
E.
"Final Development Plan" means the Final Development
Plan for George Osmond Estates, a Subdivision, as approved by
the City Council of Provo, Utah, on the 22nd. day of February
1977, and any supplement or amendment thereto.

,

F.
P a r c e l " means any lesser included legal d e s c r i p t i o n
of real property which f a l l s w i t h i n the boundaries o f the real
property described 1n A r t i c l e I I hereof I n c l u d i n g , without
l i m i t i n g the g e n e r a l i t y of the f o r e g o i n g , any b u i l d i n g or
s t r u c t u r a l component t h e r e o f s i t u a t e upon the Property, but
shall not i n c l u d e the Common Area.
G.
" P l a t " means George Osmond Estates, a Subdivision
located i n 5ect1on 19, Township 6 South. Range 3 East, Utah
County* C i t y of Provo% Utah, as f i l e d f o r record in the
o f f i c e s of the Court Recorder of Utah County, Utah* DH the
1st, day o f
March
1977.
H.
"Owner" means the record owner, whether one or more
persons or e n t i t i e s , o f the fee simple t i t l e t o any P a r c e l ,
but s h a l l not mem or r e f e r to any person or e n t i t y who holds
such i n t e r e s t merely as s e c u r i t y f o r the performance of a debt
Dr other o b l i g a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g a mortgagee or
beneficiary
under a deed o f t r u s t , unless and u n t i l such person has
acquired fee simple t i t l e pursuant t o foreclosure or other
proceedings.
I.
" U t i l i t y L i n e s ' means a l l water and sewer p i p e l i n e s
and gas mains which 11e beneath the surface o f the ground, a l l
f i r e hydrants, and a l s o a l l e l e c t r i c , telephone, and other
wire l i n e s , w i t h poles and other necessary appurtenances which
run above or below the surface of the ground.
J
Board o f Managers" means the governing body o f the
Council, elected by t h e members of the Council, t o perform t h e
o b l i g a t i o n s o f the Council r e l a t i v e t o o p e r a t i o n , maintenance
and management of George Osmond Estates.

ARTICLE I I
PROPERTY 5UBJECT TO THIS DECLARATION
AND ADDITIONS THERETO
Section 2.1 E x i s t i n g Property. The real property which i s ,
and shall be, h e l d , t r a n s f e r r e d , s o l d , conveyed, and occupied, subject
to tftilTDlfcTaratioTrilf l o c a t e d 1h~ the~Cit3 r FfTrovo,~"Courfty o f " U t a h , and"
State of Utah, more p a r t i c u l a r l y described m E x h i b i t A attached hereto
and by t h i s reference made a p a r t hereof, SUBJECT TO the r i g h t s - o f - w a y
f o r ingress and egress f o r s e r v i c e and emergency vehicles granted over,
across, on and through any and a ] l p r i v a t e roads and ways now or h e r e a f t e r
established on the Property as more f u l l y s e t f o r t h i n the P l a t and d l l
s t r e e t s and easements appearing thereon.
ARTICLE I I I
ARCHITECTURAL CONTROL
Section 3.1 Board. The George Osmond Estates A r c h i t e c t u r a l
and Planning Control Board s h a l l consist of t h r e e members who s h a l l be
designated by the Board of Managers of the Council. The Board s h a l l
review, study, and approve o r r e j e c t proposed improvements upon the
Property subject t o these covenants and r e s t r i c t i o n s .
Section 3 . 2 . Rules. The Board may make such r u l e s and bylaws as i t may deem appropriate t o govern i t s proceedings.
Section 3.3 Approval o f Plan. No b u i l d i n g , o u t b u i l d i n g ,
fence, w a l l , or other improvements t h a t are not already located on such
property shall be c o n s t r u c t e d , erected or maintained, nor s h a l l any
additions thereto, or a l t e r a t i o n t h e r e i n , be made u n t i l plans and
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s showing the d e s i g n , c o l o r , l o c a t i o n , m a t e r i a l s , l a n d s c a p m q ,
and such other information r e l a t i n g to such Improvement as the Board may
reasonably require s h a l l have been submitted to and approved by the
Board m w r i t i n g .
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Section 3 4 Schedule of Submissions and Approvals
Each
builder or owner will submit the required plans and specifications tD
the Board at least f i f t e e n (15) days before the desired date of approval.
If the design 1s disapproved, the builder or owner will re-submit plans
and specifications with the required changes. The Board will reserve
the right tD require reasonable extension of time and additional information
in order to make decisions on approvals.
Section 3.5 C r i t e r i a . In passing upon such plans and specifications, the Board shall consider*
A.

Professional Services and Documents.

1.
Architectural arid Engineering Services.
Each Builder or Owner will hire competent architectural
and engineering advisors who will coordinate the design
and construction documents for the construction of each
s t r u c t u r e , addition, change or a l t e r a t i o n with t h e
a r c h i t e c t and engineer who are employed as advisors to
the Board. The design and construction documents shall
provide a construction schedule with an estimated date of
completion for each phase of construction.
2Documents. Each Builder or Owner will submit
for approval the following documents
a.
Design documents, which show general
dispostion of s t r u c t u r e s , finish materials and
equipment Dn floor plans and elevations with perspectives as required for explanation. Each set of
design documents will designate the number and area
of each living unit type to be constructed, together
with the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the use to be made of
each room or space included in each living u n i t
type.
b
Construction documents which show informat i o n m drawings and specifications as required for
building permit, e f f i c i e n t communication for construction,
and review of systems and materials quality by the
Declarant.
&•
Generally. It shall be an objective of the Board to
make certain t h a t no improvements will impair the monetary and
-aesthetic values of George Osmond E s t a t e s . - The_ Board shall
consider the s u i t a b i l i t y of the improvements and the materials
of which they are to be constructed with respect to t h e p a r t i c u l a r
area in which they are to be located, the quality of materials
to be u t i l i z e d in any proposed improvement and the e f f e c t of
any proposed -improvement on adjacent or neighboring property
ana the locateo* and character and method of u t i l i z a t i o n o^
all u t i l i t y l i n e s .
Section 3.6 Effect of Board's Failure to Act. In t h e event
the Board fails to approve or disapprove plans and specification documents
submitter to i t withm t h i r t y (3D) days of submission, no extension of
time has been required, and no s u i t to enjoin the construction has been
CDfnnencecj prior t o the completion thereof, approval shall not be required
and the belated covenants shall be determined t o have been fully complied
with. The Board shall not be l i a b l e tD any person for i t s actions in
connection with submitted documents, unless i t can be shown t h a t they
acted with malice or wrongful i n t e n t .
ARTICLE IV
MEMBERSHIP AND VOTING RIGHTS
IN THE COUNCTT
Section 4.1 Membership. Members of the Council shall be
every Owner of a fee or undivided fee i n t e r e s t 1n any Parcel subject by
covenants of record to assessment by t h e Council and every person who
holds a contract purchaser's i n t e r e s t of record in a Parcel. There
shall be no other qualification for membership except as set forth
above. Membership shall terminate on t r a n s f e r of a fee simple t i t l e by
an Owner or the contract purchaser's i n t e r e s t by a contract purchaser
who qualifies as a member. If an Owner s e l l s a Parcel by contract of
s a l e , upQn recordation thereof* the Owner's membership shall terminate
' ** - ^ ^ f h i n crhail commence.
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Section 4.2 Compliance with Council A r t i c l e s , By-Laws, e t c .
Each Owner shall abide by and benefit from each provision/covenant,
condition and r e s t r i c t i o n contained in the Articles of Incorporation and
By-Laws of the Council, a copy of which i s provided to each Owner at the
time of purchase, and by which each Owner agrees to be bound, or which
is contained in any r u l e , regulation, or r e s t r i c t i o n promulgated pursuant
to said Articles and By-Laws. The obligations, burdens, and benefits of
membership in the Council, to the extent that they touch and concern the
land, shall be covenants running with each Owner's Parcel for the
benefit of all other Parcels and the Common Area.
Section 4.3 Voting Rights. The voting rights of the members
shall be as specified in the A r t i c l e s of Incorporation.
ARTICLE V
RIGHTS IN THE COMMON AREA
Section 5.1 Members1 Licenses of Enjoyment. Every member of
the Council shall have an irrevocable license to enjoy the Common Area.
Access to the private road may be controlled by a lockable gate, provided
that said gate must meet all requirements of the City of Provo and other
governmental agencies.
Section 5.2 Title to Common Area. The Declarant, its successors
and assigns shall retain the legal title to the Common Area until such
time as it has completed improvements thereon and until such time as, in
the opinion of the Declarant, the Council is able to maintain the same,
but notwithstanding any provisions herein, the Declarant hereby covenants,
for itself, its heirs and assigns, that it shall convey the Common Area
to the Council not later than October 1, 1978.
Section 5.3 Right to Transfer. The right of the Council tD
dedicate or transfer all or any part of the Common Area tD any public
agency, authority, or utility for such purposes and subject to such
conditions as may be agreed to by the members, provided that no such
dedication or transfer, determination as to the purposes or as to the
conditions thereof, shall be effective unless an instrument signed by
members entitled to cast two-thirds (2/3) of the votes has been recorded,
agreeing to sjjch 9^ej^caJnon,_J:ransfer,__purpose_or condition, and unless
written notice of the proposed agreement and action thereunder is sent
to every member at least thirty (30) days in advance of any action
taken.
ARTICLE VI
COVENANT FOR MAINTENANCE ASSESSMENTS
Section 6.1 Creation of the Lien and Personal Obligation of
Assessments. Each Owner of any Parcel by acceptance of a deed therefor,
whether or not it shall be so expressed in any such deed or other conveyance
agrees to pay to the Council: (1) annual assessments or charges as
provided herein; and (2) special assessments for capital improvements,
such assessments to be fixed, established, and collected from time to
time as hereinafter provided. The annual and special assessments,
together with such interest thereon and costs of collection thereof as
hereinafter provided, shall be a charge on the land and shall be a
continuing lien upon the property against which each such assessment is
made until paid. Each ^uch assessment, together with such interest
thereon and cost of collection thereof as hereinafter provided, shall
also be the personal obligation of the person who was the Owner of such
Parcel at the time when the assessment
fell due.
Section 6.2 Purpose of Assessments. The assessments levied
by the Council shall be used for the purpose of promoting the health,
safety, and welfare of the residents of George Osmond Estates and in
particular for the improvement and maintenance of the Property, the
services, and facilities devoted to this purpose and the Common Area,
including but not limited to, the payment of taxes and insurance thereon
and general maintenances repair, replacement* and additions thereto, the
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cost of labor, equipment, m a t e r i a l s , management, and supervision t h e r e o f .
No assessments or fees hereunder s h a l l be used f o r c a p i t a l Improvements
or expenditures unless approved by a vote of t w o - t h i r d s o f the membership
o f the Council and mortgagees.
Section 6.3 Assessments
Annual assessments s h a l l begin i n
the year beginning January 1 , 197B. Unless changed by vote of the
membership, the maximum annual assessment f o r any Parcel s h a l l be 5200.00
per year. The Board of Managers of the Council may, a f t e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n
of the current maintenance costs and the f i n a n c i a l requirements o f the
Council, f i x the actual assessment at an amount less than the maximum.
The maximum annual assessment may be charged as f o l l o w s :
A.
From and a f t e r January 1 , 1978, the maximum annual
assessment may be increased each year not more than 10% above
the maximum assessment f o r the previous year w i t h o u t a vote o f
the membership.
B.
From and a f t e r January 1 , 1978, the maximum annual
assessment may be increased above 10% by a vote of o n e - h a l f
(1/2) o f the members who are v o t i n g i n person Dr by p r o x y , a t
a meeting duly c a l l e d f o r t h i s purpose.
C.
The Board o f Managers may f i x the annual assessment
at an amount n r t 1n excess of the maximum.
Written notice o f any meeting o f members c a l l e d to change t h e
maximum annual assessment s h a l l be sent t o a l l members at l e a s t t h i r t y
(30) days in advance of the date of such meeting, s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e
purposes of the meeting.
5ectlDn 6.4 Special Assessments for Capital Improvements.
In addition to the annual assessments authorized by 5ect1on 6.3 h e r e o f ,
the Board of Managers of t h e Council may levy a special assessment f o r
the purpose of d e f r a y i n g , i n whole or in p a r t , the cost o f any c o n s t r u c t i o n
or r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , unexpected r e p a i r or replacement of any c a p i t a l
improvements upon the Common Area, i n c l u d i n g the necessary f i x t u r e s and
personal property related t h e r e t o , provided t h a t any such assessment
s h a l l have the assent of t w o - t h i r d s (2/3) of The votes of the Council
who are voting i n person o r by proxy at a meeting duly c a l l e d f o r t h i s
purpose, w r i t t e n notice o f which s h a l l be sent t o a l l members at Jjeast
t h i r t y (30) days in advance and s h a l l set f o r t h the purpose o f t h e
meeting.
Section 6.5 Quorum. A quorum f o r any action a u t h o r i z e d under
Sections 6.3 and 6.4 hereof s h a l l be as f o l l o w s :
At the f i r s t meeting c a l l e d , as provided m Sections 6.3 and
6,4 hereof, the presence a t the meeting of members, or o f
proxies e n t i t l e d t o cast s i x t y percent (6D2) o f a l l votes o f
the Council s h a l l c o n s t i t u t e a quorum. I f the r e q u i r e d quorum
i s not forthcoming a t any meeting, another meeting may be
c a l l e d , subject t o the n o t i c e requirements set f o r t h i n Sections
6.3 and 6.4 and t h e required quorum at any such subsequent
meeting shall be one-half of the required quorum at the
preceding meeting, provided t h a t no such subsequent meeting
shall be held more than s i x t y (60) days f o l l o w i n g the preceding
meeting.
Section 6.6 Payment o f Annual Assessments* Due Dates. The
annual assessments provided f o r herein s h a l l be payable i n semi-annual
installments (1/2 of the annual assessment) on the f i r s t day of each
January and July of each year. The due date o f any special assessments
under Section 6.4 hereof s h a l l be f i x e d i n the r e s o l u t i o n a u t h o r i z i n g
such assessment.
Section 6.7 Duties of the Council. The Council s h a l l , a t
l e a s t ten (10) days i n advance o f the assessment date or p e r i o d , prepare
a r o s t e r of the p r o p e r t i e s and assessments a p p l i c a b l e t h e r e t o which
shall be kept i n the o f f i c e o f the Council and s h a l l be open t o i n s p e c t i o n
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by any Owner, and shall at that time, fix the amount o^ the assessment
m accordance with this Declaration against each Parcel for each assessment
period.
Written notice of the assessment shall thereupon be sent
to every Owner and mortgagee or prospective mortgagee subject thereto.
A list of mortgagees to whom notices are to be sent,
shall be maintained by the Council and changes therein shall be the
responslblity of the Owners.
The Council shall, upon demand at any time furnish to any
Owner and mortgagee, or prospective Owner or mortgagee liable for said
assessment, a certificate in writing signed by an officer of the Council,
setting forth whether said assessment has been paid. 5uch certificate
shall be conclusive evidence of payment of any assessment therein stated
to have been paid.
Section 6.8 Effect of Non-Payment of Assessment* The Personal
Obligation of the OwnerTThe Lien, Remedies of Declarant
If the assessments
are not paid on the date when due (being the dates specified 1n Section
6.6 hereof), then such assessment shall become delinquent and shall,
together with such interest thereon and cost of collection thereof as
hereinafter provided, thereupon become a continuing lien on the property
which shall bind such property 1n the hands of the then Owner, his
heirs, devisees, personal respresentatives and assign^. The personal
obligation of the then Owner to pay such assessment shall in addition
remain his personal obligation until such assessment is paid or the
statutory period runs, whichever is shorter.
If the assessment is not paid within thirty (30) days
after the delinquency date, the assessment shall bear interest from the
date of delinquency at the rate Df ten percent (10%) per annum, and the
Council may bring an action against the party personally obligated to
pay the same and/or foreclose the lien against the property, and there
shall be added to the amount of such assessment the costs of preparing
and filing the complaint in such action, and in the event a judgment is
obtained, such judgment shall include interest on the assessment as
above provided and reasonable attorney's fees to be fixed by the court
together with all other costs of the action.
Section 6.9 Subordination of the Lien to Mortgages, The lien
of the assessments provided herein shall be subordinate tD the lien of
any first mortgage or deed of trust now or hereafter placed upon the
Property or any Parcel or portion thereof subject to assessment. Sale
or transfer of such property pursuant to a decree of foreclosure or by a
public trustee's foreclosure, or any other proceeding or deed in lieu of
foreclosure, shall relieve such property from assessments previously
levied, but shall not relieve such property from liability for any
assessments assessed after such acquisition of title, nor from the lien
of any such subsequent assessment.
Section 6.10 Exempt Property. The following property subject
to this Declaration shall be exempted from the assessments, charge and
lien created herein.
A.
All properties to the extent Df any easement or
other interest therein dedicated and accepted by the local
public authority and devoted to public use;
B.

The Common Area;

U
All properties exempted from taxation by the laws of
the State of Utah, upon the terms and to ihe extent of such
legal exemption.
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Section 6.11 Exterior Maintenance, In addition to maintenance
upon the Common Area, the Council may provide exterior maintenance upon
each Parcel which is subject to assessment under this Article VI hereof,
as follows: paint, repair, replace and care for roofs, gutters, downspouts,
exterior building surfaces, trees, shrubs* grass walks, and other exterior
improvements.
Section 6.12 Assessment of Cost. The cost of such exterior
maintenance shall be assessed against the Parcel upon which such maintenance
is done and shall be added to and become a part Df the annual assessment
or charge or charges to which such Parcel is subject under this Article
VI hereof and, as part of such assessment Dr charge, it shall be a lien
against the Parcel and obligation of the Owner or Owners thereof and
shall become due and payable in all respects as provided in this Article VI
hereof.
Section 6.13 Access at Reasonable Hours. For the purpose
solely of performing the maintenance required by this Article, the
Council, through its duly authorized agents or employees shall have the
right, after reasonable notice to the Owner, to enter upon any Parcel at
reasonable hours, provided that in the case of emergencies the Council,
through its authorized agents or employees, may enter upon the Parcel at
any time.

ARTICLE VII
PROTECTIVE COVENANTS
Section 7.1 Improvements P r o h i b i t e d . No used or secondhand
s t r u c t u r e , no b u i l d i n g of a temporary c h a r a c t e r , no mobile home, house
t r a i l e r , t e n t , shack or o u t b u i l d i n g s h a l l be placed or used on the
Property, either t e m p o r a r i l y or permanently; except t h a t necessary
appurtenances f o r and during actual c o n s t r u c t i o n may be used and t r a i l e r s
and structures of a temporary nature may be used during the p e r i o d of
permanent c o n s t r u c t i o n of an approved and allowed improvement, but no
longer period than 12 months without the w r i t t e n consent of the Board.
Section 7.2 Signs. No s i g n s , b i l l b o a r d s , posterbD^rds Dr
a d v e r t i s i n g s t r u c t u r e of any kind s h a l l be erected or maintained f o r any
purpose whatsoever except such signs as have been approved by t h e Board
as"~rea"sonab~ly hel:£^s~ary~for~~identTfication"bf residences" and" p1aces~of~
business. Any signs which are permitted under the foregoing r e s t r i c t i o n s
shall be erected o r maintained on the P r o p e r t i e s only with the p r i o r
w r i t t e n approval o f the Board which approval shall be given o n l y i f such
signs shall be of a t t r a c t i v e design and s h a l l be as small a s i z e as
reasonably possible and s h a l l be placed or located as directed or
approved by the Board,
Section 7.3 Water and Sewage. Each s t r u c t u r e designed f o r
occupancy or use by human beings s h a l l connect w i t h the water and sewage
f a c i l i t i e s of the C i t y o f Provo or such water and/or sewer systems as
the Board may approve. No p r i v a t e well s h a l l be used as a source of
water f o r human consumption or i r r i g a t i o n , nor shall any f a c i l i t y other
than those provided as set out above be used f o r disposal of sewage.
Section 7.4 Trash and Sewage. No t r a s h , ashes or o t h e r
refuse or debris may be thrown or dumped on the Property. The burning
of refuse o u t - o f - d o o r s shall not be p e r m i t t e d . No i n c i n e r a t o r s or o t h e r
device f o r the burning Df refuse indoors s h a l l be constructed, i n s t a l l e d
or used by any person except as approved by the Board. Waste m a t e r i a l s ,
garbage and trash s h a l l be kept i n s a n i t a r y containers and s h a l l be
enclosed and screened from p u b l i c view and protected from disturbance
and shall be disposed of w i t h reasonable promptness.
Section 7.5 Livestock.
Dogs, cats or other customary household
pets may be kept on the Property, not t o exceed two per Parcel w i t h o u t
the w r i t t e n approval of the Board of Managers. However, no pet may be
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kept which abnormally i n t e r f e r e s with the r i g h t s , comforts or convenience
of other Owners. Breeding of any animals on the Property is s p e c i f i c a l l y
prohibited, All pets must be kept on a leash when outside i t s Owner's
Parcel,
Section 7.6 Setback Requirements. The location of each
improvement with r e l a t i o n to property lines must be within the buildable
area established for i t on the Final Development Plan and the P l a t . The
location of each improvement within the buildable area must also be
approved in advance by the Board. In determining the proper location
for each improvement, the Board shall consider the location of existing
and future improvements on adjacent property, and such other monetary or
a e s t h e t i c consideration as i t may deem necessary.
Section 7.7 Landscaping and Gardening. All surface areas
disturbed by construction shall be returned promptly to t h e i r natural
condition.
Section 7.8 Trade Names. No word, name, symbol or combination
thereof shall be used t o identify for commercial purposes a s t r u c t u r e ,
business or service, unless the same shall have been f i r s t approved in
writing by the Board.
Section 7.9 Continuity of Construction. All structures
commenced shall be prosecuted diligently to completion.
5ection 7.10 Noxious or Offensive Activity. No noxious or
offensive activity shall be carried on upon any Parcel nor shall anything
be done or placed on the Property which is or may become a nuisance or
cause embarrassment, disturbance or annoyance to others.
Section 7.11 Maintenance of Property. Every Parcel, including
improvements, shall be kept and maintained by the Owner thereof i n a
clean, safe, a t t r a c t i v e and sightly condition, and in good r e p a i r ; no
inoperative private automobile shall be placed or remain on any Parcel
or adjacent s t r e e t for more than 48 hours; no commercial type vehicles
and no trucks shall be stored or parked on any Parcel or residential
s t r e e t except while engaged in t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ; t r a i l e r s , mobile homes,
trucks, boats, tractors,
campers not on a truck, vans of any kind%
buses, snow removal equipment and garden or maintenance equipment shall
be kept at all times, except when in actual use, in a closed s t r u c t u r e
or screened from view; service areas, storage p i l e s , f a c i l i t i e s f o r
hanging, drying or airing "clothing Tor "household fabrics shall "be^appropriatelyscreened from view, and no lumber, grass, shrub or t r e e clippings or
plant waste, metals, bulk materials, scrap, refuse or trash shall be
kept, stored or allowed to accumulate on any Parcel.
Section 7.12 Annoying Lights, Sounds or Odors. No l i g h t s
shall be emitted from any property which are unreasonably bright or
cause unreasonable glare; no sound shall be emitted from any Parcel
which is unreasonably loud or annoying; and no odor shall be emitted
from any Parcel which is noxious or offensive to others.
Section 7.13 Fences. No fences, walls or other b a r r i e r s
shall be permitted except with the written consent of the Board.
Section 7.14 Subdivision. No Owner shall further subdivide
any Parcel of the Property after the same has been platted, and the plat
approved as required by the City of Provo, Utah, without the consent of
the Board in writing and proper presentation to and acquiescence by the
City of Provo.
ARTICLE VIII
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section B.l Duration. The covenants and r e s t r i c t i o n s of t h i s
Declaration shall run with and bind the land and shall inure to the
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benefit of and be binding upon the Owner of any Parcel and subject to
t h i s Declaration, t h e i r respective legal representatives, heirs, s u c c e s s o r s ,
and assigns, for a period of twenty-five (25) years from the date t h i s
Declaration is recorded, after which time said covenants shall be automatically
extended for successive periods of ten (10) years unless an instrument
signed by the then Owners of two-thirds (2/3) of the Parcels and a l l of
the mortgagees thereof has been recorded, agreeing to change said covenants
and r e s t r i c t i o n s in whole or in p a r t . Provided, however, that no such
agreement to change shall be effective unless written notice of t h e
proposed agreement is sent to e^ery Owner at l e a s t t h i r t y (30) days in
advance of any action taken.
Section $.2 Notices. Any notice required to be sent to any
member Owner or mortgagee under the provi r ions of t h i s Declaration
shall be deemed to have been properly sent when mailed, postpaid, to the
l a s t known address of the person who appears a member, Owner or mortgagee
on the records of the Council at the time of such mailing.
Section 8.3 Easements. Declarant hereby reserves to I t s e l f
i t s successors and assigns, perpetual easements under, over, and across
the Common Area and under, over, and across each Parcel specified on t h e
Plat for the purpose of constructing, maintaining and operating sewers
and drainage systems, conduits for l i g h t i g , heating, power, telephone,
and other methods of conducting and performing any public or quasipublic u t i l i t y service or function. Within such easements, the following
r e s t r i c t i o n s shall apply:
A.
No building, s t r u c t u r e , t r e e , or other object s h a l l
be b u i l t upon or be permitted tD encroach upon the u t i l i t y
line i t s e l f or within five (5) feet of e i t h e r side of t h e
centerlin£ of such a line without the written permission of
the Board, and Declarant reserves the r i g h t to remove all such
buildings, s t r u c t u r e s , or objects from any such area, when
i n s t a l l e d without permission of the Board. Where the board
grants su£h permissions, and i t subsequently becomes necessary
to disturb, injure or remove the same in the u t i l i z a t i o n of
the easement for the purpose for which i t i s reserved, removal
shall be accomplished a t the expense of the Owner, and n e i t h e r
the Declarant, the Council, nor the Board, nor any u t i l i t y
company u t i l i z i n g the easement with the consent of the Board
shall be responsible to the Owner for injury or damages t o
such s t r u c t u r e s , t r e e s , or other planting or object.
B.
Access tD the easements shall always be a v a i l a b l e to
the Declarant, the Council Dr to public u t i l i t i e s with t h e
consent of the Board seeking to i n s t a l l , maintain, and r e p a i r
u t i l i t y lines and f a c i l i t i e s of all s o r t s , whether or not i t
is necessary for the purposes of such a c c e s s , i n s t a l l a t i o n ,
maintenance, and r e p a i r to enter upon any other property not
designated as u t i l i t y line areas, the use of such easements to
be generally for the good of all Parcel Owners in the maintenance
of l i n e s , f a c i l i t i e s , and services.
Section 8.4 Enforcement of Covenants and R e s t r i c t i o n s .
If
any person, firm or corporation shall violate or t h r e a t e n to v i o l a t e any
of the provisions of t h i s instrument, i t shall be lawful for the Declarant,
the Council or the Board or for any person, firm or corporation owning
land included within t h i s Declaration, to i n s t i t u t e proceedings at law
or in equity to enforce the provisions of t h i s instrument, to r e s t r a i n
the person, firm Dr corporation violating or threatening to violate them
and to recover damages, actual and punitive, together with reasonable
attorneys' fees, for such violations or threatened v i o l a t i o n s . No
failure on the part of any such person, firm or corporation or Declarant
to enforce any covenant immediately after any such cause may arise s h a l l
be deemed .a waiver as to t h a t cause or of any s i m i l a r cause that may
t h e r e a f t e r arise.
Section 8.5 Declarant'5 Rights Assignable. All of the r i g h t s
of the Declarant herein reserved, including rights reserved to enforce
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any and all of the covenants and reservations shall be freely assignable
and any assignee shall succeed to all of the rights of any assignee
thereof.
Section S.6 Disclaimer of Creation of Private Property Rights
by Certain Unrecorded Public Documents. The Declarant has submitted to
zoning' and planning authorities of the City of Provo, Utah, the Final
Development Plan for the future development of George Osmond Estates, in
order to fulfill the requirements of the City ordinances relating to
zoning and subdivisions control. Said Plan is on file with the City
Clerk. The Declarant may be required to make additional submissions of
plans to the City authorities. All such plans are part of the public
controls imposed by the City upon the Declarant, Owners, residents and
users of George Osmond Estates, and they do not create, and are not
intended to create any private property or contract rights in the Owners
and residents of George Osmond Estates. The plans which the Declarant
has submitted to the City represents a plan of development which the
Declarant believes will provide maximum benefits to the residents,
Owners and the public. During the development program, however, various
factors can intervene which may hinder the effectiveness of such longrange plans and which may threaten the benefits to be derived by the
residents, Owners and the public unless such plans can be modified as
prescribed by the applicable City ordinances. Accordingly, this Declaration
is not intended to nor does grant or create any private property or
contract rights under any of the above described plans and such plans
continue to remain subject to modification by the proper City authorities
in accordance with the procedures set forth in the ordinances of the
City.
Section 8.7 Amendment. This Declaration may be amended by an
instrument signed by at least eighty percent (80%) of the Parcel owners
of record and the holders of mortgages or deeds of trust of at least
eighty percent (80%) of the Parcels. No such amendment shall be effective
unless written notice of the amendment is sent to every Owner and mortgagee
appearing in'the records of the Declarant at least thirty (30) days in
advance of any action taken. No such amendment shall be effective
unless recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Utah County,
Utah.
Section 8.8 Severability. Invalidation of any one of these
covenants or restrictions by judgment or court order shall in no wise
affect any other provisions which shall remain in full force and effect.
Section 8.9 ~Co"mpl"i ance Cerfi f i cateT At "the request of a n y —
Owner or Builder, the Council will certify to any interested lender
whether or not any default exists hereunder and the amount of any unpaid
assessments, which certification shall be binding on said Council.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Flying Diamond Development Corporation has
caused this instrument to be executed as of the date first above appearing.
FLYING DIAMOND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Attest:

k
/ \
/

.As-siftant Secretary

STATE OF COLORADO

)
) ss.
C i t y and County of Denver)
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me t h i s | Q"~
day of Q n^J?
1977, by H. P. McLish as Vice President and John F.
Jennings as1 Assistant Secretary o f F l y i n g Diamond Development C o r p o r a t i o n ,
a Utah corporation.
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[ ! ^ ^ ^ ^ » j J T N E S S my hand and o f f i c i a l

' ' A ^ . - - ' ^ ^

o n r n i s s i o n

; </ ^\0TA Ry \ # %

expires;

seal.

My Common expires March 5, 1978

^~D

' .„. A'iBL\G/< /

"Y—^

Notary Public
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^EXHIBIT A
TO DECLARATION Oft PROTECTIVE COVENANTS
DATED ."APRIL 19, 1577
Conrnendngj at a point* which 1s',,4North.487l.'4fr f e e t and West 1,210.74 f e e t
from the ^Northeast, Corner o f Section 19, ..Township 6 South,, iRange 3 E a s t ,
Salt Lake £ajser and-rMeridian; thence 1 South*0?40142•' West'35.21 f e e t ;
thence Nor t tfu83°23' West 78.67 f e e t ; .thence Nor;th 39°05S West?21.40
f e e t ; thenpe S o u t h ^ l f l 0 ! ! ' 'West 115.14 f e e t ; i t h e n c e North B5°23'45" West
28.84 f e e t ; thence-South 31°24' West 314.70 feet, thence South 63 D 35'
West 151.62 f e e t ; thence South 41 G 39' West 336.00 f e e t ; thence South
S ^ O 1 West 121.30 f e e t ; thence North 66 3P1 iWest 81.70 f e e t ; thence
North 17 3f* West 81.60" f e e t ; thence ftonth 8°5T West 186.47 f e e t ;
thence Soujih 89 52' West 158.49 f e e t ; thence North 197.35 f e e t , thence
South 89 D 22' West 86.88 f e e t ; thence North 53°22' East 4B3.85 f e e t ;
thence North 34°00 , 16" East 217.91 f e e t ; thence North 77 D 00 , 19" East
133.42 f e e t ; thence South 84 D 05 , 38 , I East 145.77 f e e t , thence North
14 o D0'47" East 144.33 f e e t ; Thence South 55DO0'29" East 183.15 f e e t ;
thence South 63 00' East 50.00 f e e t ; thence along t h e arc of a 656.38
foot radius curve t o the r i g h t 22.83 f e e t , the chord of which bears
South 27 0 59 1 4B ,, West 22.83 f e e t , thence South 44°00' East 251.54 f e e t t o
the point of beginning.
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ADDENDUM B - APRIL 26, 2007 HEARING

Mr. Landrith's motion attaching the authority of the
homeowners association.

I didn't grant--I didn't grant any

remedy to the homeowners association then because they hadn't
filed their motion, now they've filed a motion.

I don't think

the circumstances have changed and I don't think that Mr.
Landrith has put in to play material issues of fact.
True, he says he didn't ratify and true, he says
what this actions, I'm making payments under protest
demonstrate I didn't ratify, in my mind, doesn't get to the
heart of the question of the authority of the homeowners
association.

There is a homeowners association, he bought

property subject to a homeowners association and I believe the
Swan case, Swan Creek case clearly stands for the proposition
that name and legal--a name isn't actually the critical
factor, the critical factor is who has operated and acted in
the--in the role and function of a homeowners association.
And there's simply no legal dispute, there's no factual
dispute as to the fact that for a long, long time before Mr.
Landrith purchased this property and since, that the
homeowners association, as an unincorporated association
bearing a different name than that set forth in the
declarations has been active, but I'm going to grant that
portion of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
I believe that the affidavits of Mr. Landrith and
Mr. Bratt put into issue, into dispute the appropriateness of
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the remedy and the appropriateness of the expense.

I'm say--I

simply believe there's a factual dispute, I think that's an
issue that cannot be resolved on summary judgment and I am
going to deny summary judgment on that issue.
Mr. Seiler, do you want to draft an appropriate
order?
MR. SEILER: We'd be happy to, your Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. SEILER:
THE COURT:

Thank you very much, folks.
Thank you for your time.
The Court will be in recess.

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)
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